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Agricultural Land Preservation: Can
Pennsylvania Save the Family Farm?
I.

Introduction
While the farmer holds title to the land, actually, it belongs to all
the people because civilization itself rests on the soil.'
Thomas Jefferson

This simple statement presents an appropriate point of departure for an examination of measures currently employed to curb the
rampant conversion of productive agricultural land in Pennsylvania2
and throughout the United States.'

Annually, the Commonwealth

of Pennsylvania loses over 125,000 acres4 of farmland to urban5 and
other nonagricultural uses.6 Productive farmland is a finite resource.
Thus, if the current rate of conversion continues, Pennsylvania will
deplete one-quarter of the Commonwealth's available supply of productive farmland by the year 2000.'

Legislators at all levels of government' have proposed and enacted measures designed to preserve the continually shrinking supply of productive agricultural land.9 Unfortunately, two
fundamental conflicts complicate effective farmland preservation.
1. Quoted in York County Planning Commission, AgriculturalLand PreservationStudy
72 (1975) [hereinafter cited as York County Planning Commission].
2. The rate of farmland conversion is highest in the northeastern United States (Maine,
Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland and Delaware). The high rate in this region is caused by
urban pressure emanating from the Boston to Washington, D.C. megalopolis. NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL LANDS STUDY, THE PROTECTION OF FARMLAND: A REFERENCE GUIDEBOOK
FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 32 (1981) [hereinafter cited as PROTECTION OF
FARMLAND].

3. Nationally, in the eight year period 1967-1975, 23.4 million acres of agricultural land
were converted to nonagricultural use. SOIL CONSERVATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGiUCULTURE, STATISTICAL BULLETIN No. 578, POTENTIAL CROPLAND STUDY 16 (1977).
4. SOIL CONSERVATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, PENNSYLVANIA NA-

TIONAL RESOURCES INVENTORY 2 (1980) [hereinafter cited as RESOURCES INVENTORY].

5. The flat topography of most agricultural land makes farmland ideal for residential
construction. During the 1970s, 40% of the housing construction nationwide occurred on rural
land. NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL LANDS STUDY, FINAL REPORT 10 (1981) [hereinafter cited

as FINAL REPORT].
6. Other nonagricultural uses of farmland include highway easements, water storage
reservoirs and commercial shopping centers:
7. RESOURCES INVENTORY, supra note 4, at 2.
8. Federal legislators have enacted several tax measures designed to encourage agricultural production. See infra notes 123-30 and accompanying text.
9. This comment will focus on farmland conservation measures currently used in Pennsylvania. See infra notes 76-192 and accompanying text.

The first major conflict is embodied in the statement made by
Thomas Jefferson. The farmer holds title to the land and, therefore,

under the traditional view of fee simple ownership,'° the farmer determines the use of the land. Conversely, society's interest in ensur-

ing an adequate food supply" dictates that productive land remain
in agricultural use. These conflicting interests raise a complicated
issue: should society be required to compensate landowners for
ownership rights sacrificed as a result of farmland preservation
measures?' 2 Lack of compensation for lost ownership rights will
make any proposed program untenable to landowners, yet taxpayers
will balk at increased revenue requirements necessary to compensate
fully farmers for preservation restrictions placed on the land."
The second conflict underlying agricultural land preservation
efforts arises from recognition that urban growth and development 4
must be accommodated concurrently with efforts to preserve farmland. Developmental demand for real estate cannot be repressed,
but this demand conflicts with efforts to retain productive land for
agricultural use. 5 A successful farmland preservation program must
minimize the hardships resulting from the conflict between ownership rights of farmers and the needs of society, but also must satisfy
the requirements of development by providing for the ordered
6
growth of nonagricultural uses.'
This comment analyzes various Pennsylvania efforts to preserve
agricultural land in light of the above standards. Initially, discussion
focuses on the immediate and future consequences of unfettered
conversion of agricultural land' 7 and on various factors contributing
to a farmer's decision to abandon farming.' 8 An explanation and
analysis of the specific components of Pennsylvania's program to
10. Following is the traditional view of fee simple ownership: "Fee simple ownership
(the full ownership) of land may be defined as a set of interests or rights: the right to keep
others off the land; the right to sell or bequeath it; the right to use it for farming, forestry, or
outdoor recreation; the right to build structures on or beneath it; etc." PROTECTION OF FARMLAND, supra, note 2, at 148.
11. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
12. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, which through extension by
the fourteenth amendment includes state and local actions, states, in part, "nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. See
infra notes 225-42 and accompanying text.
13. In Pennsylvania, compensation for denial of a farmer's right to develop his land
could result in multibillion dollar expenditures. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
14. As Washington Senator Henry Jackson pointed out, "[bletween now and the year
2000, we must build again all that we have built before - as many homes, schools, and hospitals, in the next three decades as we built in the previous three centuries." PENNSYLVANIA
OFFICE OF STATE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT, A LAND POLICY PROGRAM FOR PENNSYLVANIA FINAL REPORT 126 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Land Policy - Program].
15. Twelve of Pennsylvania's twenty leading agricultural counties contain sizeable metropolitan areas. LAND POLICY PROGRAM, supra note 14, at 52.
16. See infra note 293 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 21-47 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 48-75 and accompanying tet.

preserve agricultural land follows.19 Finally, this comment offers

recommendations designed to improve farmland preservation efforts
in Pennsylvania.2"
II. Consequences of Agricultural Land Conversion
During the past decade, numerous state legislatures enacted
measures designed to prevent the loss of agricultural land. 2 1 Para-

doxically, the federal government annually pays farmers to plow

under productive fields.22 The concurrence of widespread concern
over loss of agricultural land and concerted efforts to reduce agricultural production underscores an important characteristic of the
23
problems associated with conversion of agricultural land. Many
negative consequences of farmland conversion are not immediately
apparent. 24 Nevertheless, while agricultural surpluses currently exist, 25 the reduction of productive capacity that accompanies conversion of agricultural land often is irreversible.2 6
Several factors combine effectively to postpone the negative im28
27
pact of agricultural land loss. Pennsylvania and most other states
19. See infra notes 76-274 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 275-321 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 51200-51295 (West 1982); MD. AGRIC. CODE ANN.
§§ 2-501 to 2-515 (1982); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 215.203-215.263, 308.345-308.406 (1977 & Supp.
1983).
22. Congress recently considered a "farm crisis" bill that would reduce the supply of
farm commodities by requiring mandatory retirement of 15% of the nation's cropland. Wehr,
Farm Economic Plight Pushes U.S. Aid to Record Levels, 40 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REPORT No.
24, 1389 (June 12, 1982).
23. The following material in the text principally relates to long-term consequences of
agricultural lai-d loss. Nevertheless, local short term effects deserve mention. Agriculture is
the second leading industry in Pennsylvania. Annually, state farms produce over $2.6 billion
in farm products which generate an estimated $6 billion in economic activity. This economic
activity keeps approximately one million workers employed in agriculturally related indutries.
Public Hearings Before the Pennsylvania Tax Commission, Erie, Pennsylvania 42 (January 20,
1981) (statement of Luther Snyder, Deputy Secretary of Agriculture). Consequently if productive farmland continually is lost to urban use, the economic benefits of agriculture will be
reduced. The land being lost is not marginal. For instance, Lancaster County, the top agricultural county in Pennsylvania, loses nearly 5000 acres of farmland annually. LAND POLICY
PROGRAM, supra note 14, at 52.
24. See infra notes 27-23 and accompanying text.
25. Bumper wheat crops in 1982 caused the price per bushel of wheat to fall from approximately $3.95 in 1981 to $3.00 in 1982. Meanwhile, production cost of a bushel of wheat
rose nearly 50C in the same period. Wehr, supra note 22, at 1390.
26. One commentator explained the irreversibility of agricultural land conversion as
follows:
Urban land will rarely, if ever, be reconverted to agricultural use. The high costs of
reconverting urban land to agricultural use make reclamation of this land extremely
unlikely. In addition, technological barriers make it difficult to restore urban land to
its former productivity, thus, even if urban land is returned to the agricultural land
stock, its utility as cropland will be drastically reduced.
Geier, Agricultural Districts and Zoning- A State-Local Approach to a National Problem, 8
ECOLOGY

L.Q. 655, 659 (1979-80).

27. In Pennsylvania, only 1.5 million acres of land have a medium to high potency for
conversion to agriculturtal production. In comparison, 6.5 million acres have little or no potency for conversion to farmland. RESOURCES INVENTORY, supra note 4, at 4.
28. The United States currently uses about 400 million acres of land for agricultural

possess a reserve of noncropland that potentially can be converted to
agricultural use. Much of this agricultural reserve, however, is of a
lower quality than land currently in production and consequently
would require application of more energy intensive farm practices.29
The annual increase in supply achieved by higher crop yield per
acre also masks the effect of agricultural land conversion. 30 During
the 1960s, the annual increase in yield per acre sufficiently satisfied
increased demand caused by population growth. 31 Nevertheless, because increased yield depends on petro-chemical fertilizers,32 the oil
shortage of the 1970s caused a substantial reduction in the average
annual increase in crop yield per acre.33
Limited agricultural reserves and annual increases in yield per
acre, however, provide no guarantee that sufficient farmland will remain available to satisfy future food production requirements.34
The two traditional components of agricultural production demand
are exports and conventional domestic uses.3 5 Currently, America
exports one-third of all farm products produced,3 6 a figure which
comprises twenty percent of the total value of all United States exports.37 As foreign nations experience rapid population growth,38
production. In addition, approximately 266 million acres of lesser quality land could be
brought into production. Geier, supra note 26, at 656.
29. Lower quality soils require a more liberal application of fertilizer and pesticides to
achieve the same production outputs as better soils which utilize less chemical inputs. Most
pesticides and fertilizers contain a petro-chemical base; that is, they are manufactured from
crude oil derivatives. Thus, increased use of fertilizers and pesticides would cause greater fuel
consumption in an industry already considered highly energy intensive. (Ten to 20 calories of
fossil energy are required to produce one calorie of food energy.) York County Planning
Commission, supra note 1, at 23.
Increased cost of these fossil fuels also has an effect on production costs. For instance, in
1975, production of one acre of corn required $5.75 worth of fuel. In 1979, the price to produce the same acre of corn rose to $11.10. AgriculturalLand Protection Act." Hearings on M.R.
2551 Before the Subco. on Family Farms, Rural Development and Special Studies, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 8 (1979) (statement of Thomas S. Foley, Chairman, Commitee,Committee on Agriculture) [hereinafter cited as ALPA Hearings].

30.

FINAL REPORT

supra note 5, at 4 (198 1).

31. During the 1960s the average annual increase in crop yield per acre was 1.6%. Id
32. See supra note 29.
33. FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 14. The average annual increase in yield per acre fell
to 0.76% in the 1970s. This low increase in yield is attributable to: rising costs of fuel, fertilizer
and other energy intensive inputs; reduction in availability of fertile agricultural land; lack of
reserve supplies of water to sustain irrigated agriculture; and loss of natural soil fertility
through erosion or salinization. ld
34. Because the United States has a large amount of agricultural land relative to population size, the nation probably will have no difficulty meeting domestic food demand through
the year 2000. Nevertheless, increased fossil fuel costs may reqire utilization of larger land
areas to produce the same amount of food currently produced in more compact areas. Geier,
supra note 26, at 660.

35.

FINAL REPORT,

supra note 5, at 55.

36. Id.
37. Id
38. Development of high-yielding hybrid strains of wheat, corn and rice a decade ago
spawned optimism that third world nations would achieve a greater degree of food self-sufficiency. The miraculous gains expected from the "Green Revolution" never materialized, how-

demand for American agricultural exports will rise dramatically. 39
Increased production requirements necessitated by rapidly rising export demand' and increased domestic consumption 4 can be

met in two ways. Farmers can bring additional amounts42 of inferior
land43 into production, or they can cultivate the remaining high
quality farmland more intensively to achieve higher yields. Both al-

ternatives require increased application of energy intensive inputs."
Although accommodating projected demand is not technically impossible,45 every irreversible conversion of productive farmland4 6 to
urban use greatly increases the costs4 7 of meeting future production

needs. Thus, one way to prevent agricultural products from becoming prohibitively expensive is to prevent conversion of productive
land.
III. Agricultural Disincentives
Farmland is sold for nonagricultural use 48 only upon cooperation between a willing seller 49 and a willing buyer. ° Consequently,
ever, because the hybrid strains required highly energy intensive cultivation practices. As Dr.
David Pimentel, an agricultural specialist at Cornell University, stated:
To feed a world population of 4 billion while employing modern intensive agriculture would require an energy equivalent of 1.2 billion gallons of fuel per day. If
petroleum were the only source of fossil energy and if all petroleum reserves were
used to feed the world population using intensive agriculture, known petroleum
reserves would last a mere 29 years.
Clark, U.S. Agriculture is Growing Trouble as Well as Crops, SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE, January 1975, at 59-64, quoted in York County Planning Commission, supra note I, at 23.
39. One study estimates the total volume of exports will increase as much as 250% by the
year 2000. FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 55.
40. Id
41. Domestic demand for agricultural products will increase by a volume of 1.0% annually during the 1980s and by .9% annually during the 1990s. Id. at 53.
42. Projected demand for agricultural products will necessitate cultivating 77 to 113 million additional acres by the year 2000. Uncertainty about increases in yield per acre creates
the wide variance contained in this estimate. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
43. Utilization of inferior land entails increased production costs, including higher energy-related expenditures, see supra note 29, and certain soil conservation considerations. Intensive use of poorer quality lands often leads to erosion and desertification that, in turn, can
cause water pollution problems. Furthermore, these negative effects may render marginal land
brought into production incapable of supporting agricultural operations in as little as 10 to 20
years. Geier, supra note 26, at 661-62.
44. See supra note 29.
45. See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
46. See supra note 26.
47. See supra note 43.
48. Sale of farmland precipitated by the factors discussed in this section does not always
result in the land's conversion to nonagricultural use. Another farmer may purchase the land
and maintain the property in agricultural production. It must be noted, however, that most of
the factors encouraging a farmer to abandon farming also discourage purchase by individuals
interested in agricultural production.
49. One instance of an unwilling seller occurs when state or local government exercises
the power of eminent domain and condemns land for public use. Thus, exercise of eminent
domain for highway construction impacts greatly on farmland preservation efforts. See
Schmidt, Freeway Impact on AgriculturalAreas, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 567 (1980).
50. Real estate demand pressure plays an important role in the conversion of farmland.
In primarily agricultural areas, land mostly is demanded for continued farm use. Accordingly,

a successful agricultural land preservation program must address the
factors that combine to transform an increasing number of farmers
into willing sellers.
Family farming in the United States is not a profitable enterprise." Although most farm families maintain at least one source of
nonfarm income, 52 they still receive less income per capita than the
nonfarm population.5 3 Furthermore, a farm's profitability often depends upon elements beyond the farm operator's control. Diverse
and uncontrollable factors like world climate conditions and international politics, as well as domestic policy concerning 54interest rates
and price supports, influence the farmer's net income.
In addition to the general economic instability of the agricultural industry, in the past decade farmers encountered ever-increasing production costs resulting from rising energy and transportation
expenditures.5 5 Government demands in the form of property, estate and inheritance taxes 56 impose another obstacle to farm profitability and continued agricultural operation.
The discouraging economic atmosphere of agriculture is one
major reason that farmers leave the farm. Common demographic
factors,5 7 however, also influence the sale of agricultural land and its
subsequent conversion to nonagricultural use. A farmer's age,5 8
health, disability, retirement plans, desire to live elsewhere, and
death all can contribute to a decision to abandon farming. 9
Most farmers tie up a large portion of their estates in land.6 °
the price for property reflects agricultural value and not developmental value. In rural-urban
fringe areas, where demand for land is great, developmental value determines the price of
farm property. The higher prices offered for land under urbanization pressure provide an
added incentive for farmers to sell land to purchasers who intend to use the land for a purpose
other than agricultural production. Keene, Agricultural Land Preservation: Legal and ConstitutionallIssues, 15 GONZ. L. REV. 621, 623 (1979-80).
51. Farm profit margins have declined steadily since 1900. Annually, an estimated 40%
of farms operate at a loss. Moreover, in 1970, nearly 75% of all farm families would have been
classified as low income (less than $5000 in family income) if only farm income had been
considered. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY, 96TH
CONG., 2D SESS., FARM

NUMBER

AND

STRUCTURE:

A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON CHANGES

IN THE

SIZE OF FARMS 28-29 [Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as FARM

STRUCTURE].

52. Ninety-two percent of all farm families have at least one source of income in addition
to farming. Id. at 29.
53. Id In 1975 farmers earned only 90% of the incomeper capita received by the nonfarm population. Id
54. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
55. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 80-139 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
58. The average age of farmers increased from 48.7 years in 1945 to 51.7 years in 1974.
This age increase indicates that young people do not hold a popular view of farming. In fact,
younger farmers replaced only slightly more than 50% of the older persons who left farming
between 1964 and 1974. FARM STRUCTURE, supra note 51, at 31.
59. Keene, supra note 50, at 623.
60. A Maryland study, conducted in the mid-1970s, indicated that retirement and death
accounted for a major portion of all agricultural land sales and were particularly significant in

Thus, sale of agricultural property affords the liquidity required for
comfortable retirement:61 If a farmer wishes to retain his farmhouse
for retirement, he can separate the cropland from the homestead and
either sell to a developer or subdivide. 62 Similarly, death of the principal landowner may necessitate
the sale of cropland to pay inheri63
tance and estate

taxes.

Finally, a variety of specific impediments to agricultural production confront farmers located on the rural-urban fringe. As residential developments arise in areas previously devoted to
agriculture, tensions often develop between suburbanites and farmers.' The new residents complain of farm odors from livestock, pes66
ticides and fertilizers.65 The volume of litter deposited in fields

increases, and vandalism of farm equipment occurs.67 Increased
road traffic may impede or make hazardous the transfer of farm
equipment to distant fields. 68 Moreover, as the transition from agricultural area to residential development proceeds, suburbanites gain
control of local government bodies. 69 This situation frequently results in passage of nuisance ordinances that restrict farm practices.7 °
As more farms succumb to subdivision, agricultural support industries 7' close down or relocate thus making it more difficult for
remaining farmers to continue operations, 72 The cumulative effect
of these occurrences resigns agricultural holdouts to the inevitability
of urbanization and causes remaining farm operators to refrain from
further capital investments in their own farms. The result is a perpetuation of the urbanization cycle.73
causing sales that led to conversion to nonagricultural use. Retirement and death of farmers
accounted for 42% of all land sales and 85% of sales that resulted in residential development of
agricultural land. Peterson, Tax Policy and Land Conversion at the Urban Fringe (URB. INST.,
Land Use Center Working Paper 0875-04, December, 1974), cited in Currier, An Analysis of
Differential Taxation As A Method ofMaintainingAgriculturaland Open Space Land Uses, 11
LAND USE & ENV'T L. REV. 443, 456 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Currier].
61. Currier, supra note 60, at 456.
62. Id
63. See infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
64. For an excellent account of the manner in which tensions between farmers and suburbanites arise, see the "McCahill Case," NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL LANDS STUDY, ZONING
TO PROTECT FARMING: A CITIZENS' GUIDEBOOK 7 (1981).

65. Id
66. Although seemingly insignificant, litter can have a severe effect on agriculture. In
one case, several head of cattle died inexplicably. An autopsy revealed that glass bottles had
been broken and baled into hay that later was fed to the livestock. PROTECTION OF FARMLAND, supra note 2, at 128.
67. Id
68. Id
69. Id
70. Id Local nuisance ordinances may prohibit operation of farm machinery between
certain hours, limit the allowable amount of livestock, or restrict the use of natural fertilizers.
Id at 89.
71. Agricultural support industries include machinery repair facilities, processing plants,
farm markets, feed stores, livestock auctions, veterinary clinics and grain elevators.
72. PROTECTION OF FARMLAND, supra note 2, at 33-37.
73. Id

Some occurrences that negatively impact on farming are beyond
the scope of any agricultural land preservation program.74 Other
problems faced by the agricultural industry, however, like fluctuating prices and repressive tax treatment, can be resolved only through
coordinated local, state and federal efforts. 75 Furthermore, land use
restrictions alone clearly cannot promote continued agricultural production. Rather, a successful program must offer the farmer some
incentive to remain in agriculture and must remove impediments to
continued operation of family farms.
IV.

Pennsylvania's Approach to Agricultural Land Preservation

The Pennsylvania "program" to protect farmland is a collection
of independent state 76 and local 77 government measures that, for the
most part, are not interrelated. Measures enacted at the state level
primarily provide incentives to encourage continued agricultural
production.78 Conversely, most local government measures can be
characterized as restrictive because they seek to prohibit conversion
of agricultural land to nonagricultural use.7 9
A.

State PreservationEfforts

Incentives provided by the state to encourage continued agricultural production include preferential property and inheritance tax
treatment for farmers, protection from local nuisance ordinances,
beneficial sewer and water assessment standards for farmland and
protection from certain state and local eminent domain activities.
1. Property Tax Relief-The major tool of farming is land.

Urbanization increases demand for this land and consequently
pushes property values higher.8 ° Since the government bases property tax assessments on the highest and best use of the relevant property,81 the tax assessed land devoted to agriculture use is assessed
74. Agricultural preservation programs cannot prevent the sale of farmland when a sole
operator dies. Preservation measures may attempt, however, to prevent sales necessitated
solely by disproportionate estate liability. See infra notes 120-39 and accompanying text.
75. Agricultural price supports and programs to facilitate farm exports, by necessity, require federal administration.
76. See infra notes 80-175 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 193-250 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 275-79 and accompanying text.
79. Zoning is the major local government measure utilized to prohibit conversion of agricultural land. See infra notes 193-274 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 50.
81. Pennsylvania's assessment value provision states:
It shall be the duty of the . . . assessors . . . to assess, rate and value all objects of

taxation . . . according to the actual value thereof, and at such rates and prices for
which the same would separately bonafide sell. In arriving at actual value the county
may utilize either the current market value or it may adopt a base year market value.
In arriving at such value the price at which any property may actually have been sold
shall be considered but shall not be controlling. Instead such selling price, estimated

according to its higher value for developmental use.8 2 This assessment practice places a disproportionate property tax burden on
farmers.83
Accordingly, most states,84 including Pennsylvania,85 have attempted to preserve agricultural land by reducing the property tax
burden on farmers. Most states accomplish this reduction through a
differential assessment program.8 6 Differential property taxation
theoretically is a relatively simple concept.8 7 Farmland is assessed at
or actual, shall be subject to revision by increase or decrease to accomplish equalization with other similar property within the taxing district.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5020-402(a) (Purdon Supp. 1983).
82. A substantial difference often exists between agricultural use value and market value.
In 1976, farmland in Whitehall Township, Lehigh County, Pennsylvania had an assessed agricultural use value of $534 per acre and an assessed market value of $1476 per acre. PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY, INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON LAND & WATER RESOURCES,
RESEARCH PUB. No. 100, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ACT 319: THE PENNSYLVANIA FARMLAND

AND FORESTLAND ASSESSMENT ACT 25 t1977) [hereinafter cited as EFFECTIVENESS].
83. In 1977, farmers in Pennsylvania paid an average of 6.94% of their taxable income in
property taxes while nonfarmers paid only about 2.57%. In that year, property taxes were the
third highest production expense of Pennsylvania farmers. Public Hearings Before the Pennsylvania Tax Commission, Erie, Pennsylvania 86 (January 20, 1980) (statement by Jesse
Erickson).
84. Currently, 48 states have some type of differential taxation program. Of the remaining two states, Georgia has enacted no differential taxation measure and Kansas, while amending its constitution to allow differential taxation has yet to enact a program. For a complete
list of statutory citations for those states that have differential taxation program, see PROTECTION OF FARMLAND, supra note 2, at 276.

85. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.j6, §§ jj941-11947 (Purdon 1971 and Supp. 1983); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 72, §§ 5490.1-.13 (Purdon Supp. 83).
86. Currently three types of differential taxation schemes exist. The preferential taxation
system assesses qualified land at agricultural use value rather than at market value. Because
farmers who withdraw from this program incur no penalty, preferential taxation is popular
with landowners, but does not operate to prevent conversion of agricultural land.
Farmland under deferred taxation also receives agricultural use assessment rather than
market value assessment. Farmers who withdraw land from the program or convert it to a
nonagricultural use, however, must pay a rollback tax equal to the tax savings previously realized. This system also imposes a penalty computed as a percentage of the previous savings.
Nevertheless, while deferred taxation is slightly more effective than pure preferential taxation,
the program does contain certain inherent weaknesses. See infra notes 106-18 and accompanying text.
A restrictive covenant program requires that participating landowners sign a covenant not
to develop their land for a specified term in return for differential taxation treatment. Breach
of the restrictive covenant by a landowner usually results in penalties steeper than those employed in deferred taxation systems. Further, the covenants may contain provisions for specific performance of the agreement. Thus, although restrictive covenants provide greater
protection for farmland than the other programs, the severe penalties make voluntary participation less attractive to landowners.
Differential taxation has received much attention from legal scholars. See, e.g., Currier,
supra note 60; Danford, A Survey ofProperly Tax Relief Programsforthe Retention ofAgriculturaland Open Space Lands, 15 GONZ. L. REV. 675 (1978-79) [kereinafter cited as Danford];
Keene, Differential Assessment and the Preservtion of Open Space 14 URn. L. ANN. 11 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Keene].
87. Calculation of agricultural use value presents practical impediment to implementation of differential taxation. Figures from comparable land sales are unreliable because the
percentage of comparable sales price attributable to residential demand pressure cannot be
determined. Two methods have been developed to compute agricultural use value. The capitalization of income method provides a use value assessment which divides annual farm in-

agricultural use value8 8 rather than at general market value. In
echange for this beneficial tax treatment, a majority of states employing differential taxation 89 require a participating farmer to commit his land to agricultural use for a specified period of time.9"
Pennsylvania currently utilizes two separate differential taxation
schemes. Act 515,91 enacted in 1966, authorizes counties 92 to enter
into covenants with farmland owners to restrict development of agricultural land.93 In return for the farmer's promise not to develop
land for a specified period, 94 the county covenants that the property
tax assessment on the farmland "will reflect the fair market value of
the land as restricted by the covenant." 95 The agreement further requires that a farmer who breaches the covenant pay specified liqui96
dated damages to the county.
In 1973, a school district challenged Act 515 as violative of the
uniformity clause 97 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.9 8 Although
come from the land by a capitalization rate that represents a reasonable return on the farmer's
investment.
A second method for computing agricultural use value is soil productivity. Under this
system, the quality of land for agricultural production determines use value assessment. Program administrators assign farmland a rating based upon the quality of soil. This soil rating
then determines the use value assessment. Currier, supra note 60, at 445.
88. See supra note 87.
89. Thirty-one of the 48 states employing differential assessment use either the deferred
taxation method or the restrictive covenant method. See supra note 86. The remaining seventeen states use pure preferential assessment, which requires no commitment to continued agricultural use. For a list of statutory citations of states in each category, see Currier, supra note
60, at 449.
90. The period that a farmer must commit his land to agricultural use under the differential taxation systems varies from state to state. See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 246-12 (Supp.
1982) (20 Year term); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 61A, §§ 1-24 (Michie/Law Co-op. Supp. 1982) (10
year term); N:J. STAT. ANN. §§ 54:4-23.1 to 23.23 (West Supp. 1982) (2 year period).
91. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 11941-11947 (Purdon Supp. 1983). This comment refers to
the statute as Act 515, its popular name.
92. The legislature did not make the differential taxation provision of Act 515
mandatory. Rather, county implementation of the program is optional. Only five Pennsylvania counties have implemented Act 515 since passage of the statute in 1966. Those counties are: Bucks, Chester, Lehigh, Montgomery, and Northampton. EFFECTIVENESS, supra note
82, at 1.
93. Act 515 is a hybrid of deferred taxation and restrictive covenant. See supra note 86.
Thus, while the statute speaks in terms of restrictive covenant, it also provides liquidated damages similar to those utilized under deferred taxation schemes.
The covenant requires a landowner to keep the land in agricultural use for a ten year
period. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 11943 (Purdon Supp. 1983). Breach of this covenant by the
landowner results in his payment of liquidated damages that equal the tax savings realized by
the property owner for a maximum of five years and a 5% penalty on the amount of those
savings. Id.§ 11946.
Cf CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51251 (Deering 1982) (restrictive covenant agreement requires
that landowner obtain county board approval before cancelling covenant, imposes rollback tax
and 12 1/2% penalty, and provides for specific performance of the covenant).
94. See id
95. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 11943 (Purdon Supp. 1983).
96. See supra note 93.
97. PA. CONST. art. VIII, § I requires that "all taxes shall be uniform, upon the same
class of subjects, within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied
and collected under general laws."
98. In Bensalem Township School Dist. v. County Comm'rs, 8 Pa. Commw. 411, 303

the court upheld the Act's constitutionality,99 the legislature swiftly

amended the state constitution to allow differential taxation of agricultural land" ° and subsequently enacted a new differential assess-

ment measure. 1 '
The legislature did not couch the Pennsylvania Farmland and
Forest Land Assessment Act of 1974,102 the Clean and Green Act, in
terms of a covenant not to develop.0 3 Rather, any interested farmer

may apply to his county board of assessment appeals to receive differential tax treatment."° A participating farmer who abandons agricultural use of the land, however, incurs assessment of a tax

rollback and penalty. 0 5
Facially, Pennsylvania's differential taxation scheme appears to
be an effective tool to prevent conversion of agricultural land. The

scheme provides a tax break to farmers that is contingent upon continued agricultural use of the land. Nevertheless, several flaws exist
in the program and severely undermine the protection afforded agricultural land. '6
The voluntary nature of the program presents implementation
problems. If the penalties imposed for withdrawal are severe enough

to deter land conversion, farmers may hesitate to participate in the
A.2d 258 (1973), a school district challenged the validity of Act 515 on the ground that the Act
allowed nonuniform taxation of property within the county. The court found that Act 515
simply authorized counties to covenant to preserve land. Thus, the court held that the statute
neither directly imposed any tax nor exempted any property from taxation. The court added,
in dicta, that even if Act 515 was a taxing statute, no violation of the uniformity clause occurred since the Act required only that the assessment "reflect the fair market value" of the
land in question.
Differential taxation programs in other states have not faired as well. In 1960, the
Supreme Court of Maryland, the first state to enact a differential taxation scheme, declared
that tax program violative of the state's uniformity clause. See State Tax Comm'n v. Wakefield, 222 Md. 543, 161 A.2d 676 C1960). Maryland subsequently amended its constitution and
enacted a new differential taxation statute. To date, the revised Maryland scheme has not been
challenged. MD. CONST. art. 43; MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19tb) (1975 & Supp. 1983).
99. See supra note 98.
100. In May 1973, Pennsylvania amended its constitution to read: "The General Assembly
may, by law establish standards and qualifications for private forest reserves, agricultural
reserves, and land actively devoted to agricultural use, and make special provision for the
taxation thereof." PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2i
101. The Pennsylvania Farmland and Forest Land Assessment Act of 1974, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 72, §§ 5490.-.j3 urdon Suppi 1982).
102. Id.
103. The Clean and Green Act requires that a landowner desiring preferential use assessment apply to the county board of assessment appeals. Id. § 5490.4.
104. To qualify for special tax treatment, the landowner must have devoted his property
to agricultural use for the preceding three years and his land must equal at least ten contiguous
acres. Id § 5490.3.
105. The rollback tax recaptures any tax savings enjoyed by a landowner for up to seven
years. In addition, the landowner incurs a penalty equal to 6% of the realized tax savings. Id
§ 5490.8.
106. For further analysis of differential taxation as an instrument of land preservation, see
Currier, supra note 60; Danford, supra note 86; Keene, supra note 86; REGIONAL SCIENCE
RESEARCH INSTITUTE, UNTAXING OPEN SPACE: AN EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF

DIFFERENTIAL ASSESSMENT OF FARMS AND OPEN SPACE (Council on Environmental Quality

1976).

program. Thus, the legislature imposed minimal penalties to encourage widespread participation.° 7 Further, a farmer who decides
to sell can factor the weakened penalties that do remain into the sale

price. ' 8 Differential taxation actually may encourage and facilitate
land speculation on the rural-urban fringe. 0 9

A 1980 amendment to the Clean and Green Act" 0 further undermined the Act's effectiveness as a farmland preservation tool.
The new provision allows a farmer to split-off a maximum of two

acres per year from the preferentially assessed agricultural land
without incurring any tax rollback or penalty on the remaining property."I Farmers may use this split-off land for residential purposes.
Facilitating residential development in close proximity to agricultural land may create tensions that actually will hasten conversion of
12

farmland.
Finally, differential assessment may have a negative impact on
local government units. Property taxes generally provide the funds

necessary to finance county government. 1 3 If a large amount of
farmland in a county becomes enrolled in the differential taxation
program, the county will levy higher taxes on the nonfarm population to provide revenue lost through lower assessment of farm property." l4 Arguably, the nonfarm population simply pays for the
benefits provided by continued local agricultural production. The
few nonfarm residents of a predominantly rural county, however,

may pay a disproportionate share of farm subsidy compared to the
resident of a county on the rural-urban fringe where only a few scattered farms remain." 5 Thus, residents in areas where the threat of
farmland conversion is greatest may pay less to protect agriculture
107. See supra note 105.
108. A 6% penalty for conversion does not provide substantial deterrence when tax savings earn 14% if invested. A landowner either can contract to have the developer pay the
rollback and penalty or can increase the price demanded for land to cover any tax liability. In
addition, the landowner can take an income tax deduction for the rollback since the legislature
classified the rollback as a tax rather than as a penalty. PROTECTION OF FARMLAND, supra
note 2, at 63.
109. Since Pennsylvania's program contains no ownership requirement for enrolled land,
a speculator or developer can purchase land and then lease the property to a farmer until the
time becomes right for development. While the lessee farms the land, the property receives
differential assessment and thus, reduces the speculator's cost for holding the land.
110. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5490.6 (Purdon Supp. 1983).
111. The 1980 amendment to the Clean and Green Act allows farmers to split-off a maximum of the lesser of 10 acres or 10% of total enrolled land. The statute subjects the portion
split-off to rollback, but continues to assess preferentially the land remaining in agricultural
use. Id
112. See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
113. EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 82, at 31.
114. The property tax shift that occurs when substantial amounts of land receive preferential assessment actually offsets any benefit to farmers. To offset the reduction in the assessment
rate caused by lower valuation of farmland, local governments raise their millage rates. Thus,
the farmer's land receives a lower assessment value, but the county imposes a higher rate of tax
on that value. Id at 47.
115. PROTECTION OF FARMLAND, supra note 2, at 63-64.

than residents6 of a county where conversion pressure is almost

nonexistent." 1
Differential taxation alone does not afford significant protection

to agricultural lands. Although property tax relief is a subsidy" 7 to
farmers in the form of reduced agricultural production costs, coun-

ties do not distribute the cost of this subsidy equitably among those
who benefit from continued agricultural operations."I8 If differential
taxation is to remain solely as a subsidy to farmers, the system must
incorporate a mechanism to distribute evenly the cost of this

subsidy.' ,9
2. Inheritance and Estate Tax Relief -The practice of basing
assessments on market value rather than agricultural use value imposes hardships on farmers that extend beyond the adverse effects of
high property taxes.' 2 ° Federal and state taxing authorities also use

the inflated assessments to compute inheritance and estate tax liability when landowners die.' 2' Because farmers necessarily hold large
amounts of land, the high assessment values caused by residential
demand pressure greatly increase the tax liability on an agricultural
estate.' 22 If the total estate contains insufficient liquid assets, the
landowner's survivors must sell the farmland to satisfy the death
taxes.
Federal and state legislatures have enacted tax measures to
lessen the incidence of inheritance and estate tax-related agricultural
land sales. The Federal Tax Reform Act of 1976123 contains two
116. Id
117. Property tax relief provides an inefficient subsidy mechanism because benefits are
available to all landowners regardless of their income level or need for relief. Id at 64.
118. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
119. Michigan and Wisconsin enacted "circuit breaker tax credit" systems that provide a
subsidy mechanism more equitable than Pennsylvania's. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 554.701-.719 (Supp. 1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 71.09(l1) (Kest Supp. 1983).
Landowners under these systems receive a state tax income rebate for property taxes that
exceed a designated percentage of family income. The credit systems thus provide subsidies to
the low income farmers who most need relief and tend to exclude speculators and high income
farmers. Further, since state level agencies administer the rebate, the cost of the subsidy is
distributed evenly among all citizens of the state. For more information on the Wisconsin
program, see infra notes 310-25 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
121. Pennsylvania defines property value for inheritance tax purposes as "the price at
which the property would be sold by a willing seller, not compelled to sell, to a willing buyer,
not compelled to buy, both of whom have reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts." PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 2485-102(24) (Purdon Supp. 1983).
122. For example, the 100 acre farm in Whitehall Township, Lehigh County, Pennsylvania, discussed in supra note 82, would have a market value assessment of $147,600 for
inheritance tax purposes but would have an agricultural use value of only $53,400. A simplified application of the inheritance tax rate demonstrates the difference in tax liability resulting
from the two assessment method. If a farmer transferred the 100 acre Farm to his son (lineal
descendant taxed at a rate of 6%) the inheritance tax liability based upon market value assessment would be $8856. Agricultural use assessment would result in a tax liability of only $3204.
123. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-455, tit. XX, § 2003(a), 90 Stat. 1856 (1976)
(amend. 1978, 1981).

provisions aimed at easing the death impact on agricultural estates.
Section 2032A 24 allows agricultural use valuation of qualified farm
real estate

25

under certain conditions. 126 Section 6166127 permits

deferral of tax payments on qualified farm estates for five years following the landowner's death; taxes then must be paid in installment
over the next ten years.' 28 Congress enacted sections 2032A and
6166 to provide relief to family farms. Unfortunately, the restrictions and qualifications that the legislature inserted to prevent abuse
of the tax benefits' 29 narrowed application of the program to such an
extent that the average family farm estate cannot take advantage of
the provisions. 3 °
Some states, having received impetus from the federal example,
enacted their own inheritance and estate tax provisions to ease the
death tax burden on farmers.' 3 ' In 1980, Pennsylvania followed suit
124. I.R.C. § 2032A (West Supp. 1983).
125. The list of requirements to qualify for special valuation under the Federal Tax Reform Act is extensive. Major qualifications include:
(I) Fifty percent of tax adjusted value of the estate must consist of real or personal property used for farming;
(2) During the eight year period prior to decedent's death, the property must
have been owned by decedent or a member of his family for an aggregate of five
years;
(3) The real property must pass to a "qualified heir" (decedent's ancestor,
spouse, lineal descendant, spouse of lineal descendant or legally adopted children of
above individuals);
(4) All persons having an interest in the property must sign the agreement to
elect preferential valuation.
Id O § 2032A Cb),(d),(e).
126. Sale or conversion of qualified land to nonagricultural use within ten years of decedent's death triggers recapture of tax savings. Id § 2032A(c).
127. Id § 6166. This section applies generally to estates consisting largely of closely held
businesses.
128. Id
129. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
130. PROTECTION OF FARMLAND, supra note 2, at 69. While an in-depth analysis of the
federal estate tax provisions is beyond the scope of this comment, criticisms commonly leveled
at § 2032A and § 6166 should be mentioned. One analysis concluded as follows:
Congress may have promised a lot more than it gave with Sections 2032A and 6166.
Only a small fraction of the nation's family farms will be big enough to be eligible for
the benefits. Only a fraction of large farm estates have the liquidity problems which
Congress sought to alleviate, while the rest will be able to avail themselves of the
advantages. Many of the executors of eligible estates will find the restrictions imposed by Sections 2032A and 6166 so onerous-especially the back payments imposed if the farm is sold to a non-qualified heir--that they will choose not to avail
themselves of them. Others, especially those with larger estates, will have such serious liquidity problems that even substantial tax reduction and deferral will not forestall partial or full liquidation. . . . In short, only a small percentage of farm estates
will actually benefit from Section 2032A.
Id
131. States employ several different methods to reduce death tax burdens on farm estate.
Several states simply incorporate the federal definition of taxable estate into their state scheme.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 198.01-198.44 (West 1982). Other states enacted measures governing valuation that closely resemble Section 2032A. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 385
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983). Finally, a few states developed different approaches designed to
provide preferential death tax treatment to farmland. Often special estate treatment in these
states requires participation in the state's comprehensive farmland preservation program. See,
e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 118.55 (1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS §205.202d (1982) (MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 7.564 64) (Callaghan 1983)).

by adding a provision 132 to its inheritance tax law. 13 3 That provision
allows qualified' 34 farm property to be valued at its agricultural use
value for transfer inheritance tax purposes. The qualifications and
restrictions contained in Pennsylvania's enactment are less onerous 35 than those imposed in the federal measure. Consequently, the
state program enjoys wider application.
Pennsylvania's inheritance tax measure incorporates a split-off
provision identical to that found in the property tax assessment pro37
gram. 36 This split-off provision, coupled with the lenient penalty
for conversion contained in the inheritance tax measure, may detract
from the statute's effectiveness. Moreover, while Pennsylvania's provision applies more broadly than the federal measure, 38 any estate
or inheritance tax relief will 39have a positive preservation effect in
only a narrow class of cases.'
Inheritance and estate tax relief can play a valuable role in an
integrated agricultural land preservation program. Tax relief could
provide an incentive to encourage farmers to suit voluntarily to increased restrictions of their agricultural property. Inheritance tax relief standing alone, however, as it does in Pennsylvania's scheme of
noninterrelated preservation measures, is only a subsidy to farmers
and does not prevent conversion of agricultural land to nonagricultural uses.
3.

The Agricultural Area Security Law.-The

Pennsylvania

Legislature attempted to provide an integrated farmland preservation program through enactment of the Agricultural Area Security
132. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 2485-511 to 2485-514 (Purdon Supp. 1982). The legislature
repealed these provisions in 1982 and replaced them with 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1722
(1983).
133. 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1722 (1983).
134. Land devoted to agricultural use for the three years prior to the decedent's death
qualifies for inheritance tax relief. Id. § 1722(b). Compare Pennsylvania's prior use requirement to the five-of-eight year requirement of the federal provision. See supra, note 125. Further, Pennsylvania's provision does not require that the land comprise any fixed percentage of
the total estate.
135. The Pennsylvania inheritance tax valuation scheme does not specify qualified heirs,
as does the federal program. In addition, specially valued land under Pennsylvania's plan
only need remain in agricultural use for seven years following decedent's death as opposed to
ten years under the federal plan. See also supra note 134 for other comparison between the
Pennsylvania and federal programs.
136. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
137. An heir who fails to maintain agricultural use for seven years incurs tax liability for
the savings realized under special valuation plus a 6% penalty on the inheritance tax savings.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 2485-513 (Purdon Supp. 1983). The lenient penalty imposed may
encourage executors to enroll in the program and then withdraw after arrangement of a beneficial sale.
138. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
139. Estate and inheritance tax relief protects agricultural land only when liquidity
problems threaten forced sale of the farmland. In addition, even a forced sale of land may
result in purchase by another party who intends to continue agricultural use of the land. The
protection offered may prove valuable in the above limited circumstances, but application of
estate and inheritance tax benefit is too narrow to have any appreciable preservaticn effect.

Law." 4 In 1973, Governor Milton J. Shapp called for the preparation of a set of land policy goals for the Commonwealth of Penn-

sylvania. 141 After four years of meetings, conferences and hearings,
the Office of State Planning and Development recommended that
Pennsylvania adopt an agricultural districting 142 program. In June
1981, the Pennsylvania Legislature incorporated some 14 3 of these
14
recommendations into the Agricultural Area Security Law. 4

This law permits farmers to join together to create an agricultural area of five hundred acres or more. 45 Qualified land incorporated into an area then receives special protection from certain state
46
and local government actions.'
(a) Proceduresto create an agriculturalarea.-Under this program, any farmer or group of farmers that owns a minimum of five
hundred acres of viable agricultural land may propose creation of an
agricultural area to the governing body of the local government unit
in which the area is located.' 47 The governing body then must publish notice of the proposed area, submit the proposal to special com-

missions for review, and hold public hearings on the proposed
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §§ 901-915 (Purdon Supp. 1983).
141. The land policy goals called for by Pennsylvania Governor Milton Shapp resulted in
a published set of recommendations. LAND POLICY PROGRAM, supra, note 14.
142. Agricultural districting is the common name given to Pennsylvania's agricultural areas. Districting programs allow farmers voluntarily to create large contiguous blocks of farmland. Participating agricultural land then receives protection from various government
practices that adversely affect farm viability. Major protections commonly afforded participants in agricultural districts include:
(1) Protection from local government ordinances that restrict agricultural practice;
(2) Relief measures that prevent assessment of farmers for sewer and water
projects that do not provide a direct benefit to their agricultural land;
(3) Restriction on public investments in agricultural districts that may promote
conversion to nonagricultural use:
(4) Limitations on acquisition of agricultural land by public agencies through
the use of eminent domain:
(5) Differential assessment of agricultural land; and
(6) Requirements that state agencies modify regulations to reduce negative impact on agricultural districts.
PROTECTION OF FARMLAND, supra note 2, at 76-82.
143. For a discussion of the major legislative revision of the planning office recommendations, see infra note 170.
144. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 991-915 (Purdon Supp. 1982).
145. Id § 905.
146. See infra notes 153-71 and accompanying text.
147. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 905 (Purdon Supp. 1983). Pennsylvania's districting program
allows inclusion of noncontinguous parcels in agricultural areas. This provision allows inclusion of more land in agricultural areas but makes protection of that land more difficult.
New York's agricultural districting program also allows, but discourages, inclusion of
noncontiguous parcels. N.Y. AGRiC. & MKTS. LAW §§ 301-G07 (McKinney Supp. 1982). A
policy guideline for the New York program states, "Multiple boundaries of a fragmented district will tend to multiply the opportunities for conflict with nonagricultural development and
thereby reduce the effectiveness of a district. Farming communities to operate productively
need non-fragmented, defensible areas in which to operate." NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT
140.

OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION, COUNTY GUIDELINES FOR THE CREATION OF AGRICULTURAL DISTRICTS (1976), quoted in PROTECTION OF FARMLAND, supra note 2, at 83.

agricultural area.148 During commission evaluation and public hearing the following factors receive consideration: the viability of active
farming in the proposed area; the nature and extent of other land
uses both within the area and in property adjacent thereto; the local
government unit's developmental patterns and needs; and the local
government unit's comprehensive plan.'49 After consideration of
these factors, the governing body may approve or disapprove the
proposal to create an agricultural area. 5 0 From initial proposal to
final approval the creation of an agricultural area may take from six
months to a year. 5 '
(b) Provisionsforprotectionunder the Act. -The

complex pro-

cedural process involved in creation of an agricultural area implies
that the program offers extensive protection to enrolled farms and
farmers. The current Pennsylvania program, however, rewards a
farmer's perseverance for obtaining inclusion of his land in an agricultural area with only minimal substantive benefits. 152 The Agricultural Area Security Law theoretically offers four categories of
protection to participating farmers.
i)

Nuisance suit and local ordinanceprotection.-The

Agricul-

tural Area Security Law limits the ability of local government units
to pass ordinances that restrict farming practices or that include agricultural activities within a definition of public nuisance. 53 Local
governments may regulate agricultural practices and activities in an
agricultural area only when they impose a direct threat to the public
health or safety.' 54 The nuisance provision affords participating
farmers limited protection from public actions, but fails to restrict
the ability of adjacent nonfarm landowners to bring private nuisance
suits. In addition, the Pennsylvania Legislature recently eliminated
the need for this nuisance provision." 5 Act 1982-133 extends local
ordinance and nuisance protection to all farm operations in the
Commonwealth regardless of the land's inclusion in an agricultural
area. The new Act affords greater protection than previously was
148. PA. STAT. ANNI tit. 3, §§ 905-06 (Purdon Supp. 1983).
149. Id A unit development plan presents local government unit's strategy for development of a targeted segment of land contained within the unit's borders. A comprehensive plan
details development objectives for the entire local government unit. Pennsylvania law does
not require local governments to formulate either unit development or comprehensive plans.
150. Id §906.
151. Because the Agricultural Area Security Law became effective only in September
1981, no agricultural areas have been created in Pennsylvania to date. In New York, whose
procedural requirements are similar to Pennsylvania's, creation of an agricultural area requires
six months to a year. N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 303 (McKinney Supp. 1982).
152. See infra notes 155-71 and accompanying text.
153. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 911 (Purdon Supp. 1983). See also supra note 70 and accompanying text.
154. Id
155. Agricultural Operations-Protection From Nuisance Suits, Act No. 1982-133, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §§ 951-957 (Purdon Supp. 1983).

available under the Agricultural Area Security Law.' 5 6 Consequently, the legislature eliminated one incentive for participation in
an agricultural area.
ii) Policy of Commonwealth agencies.-The Agricultural Area
Security Law further seeks to encourage viable farming in agricultural areas by requiring that state agencies amend their regulations
and procedures to facilitate farm operations of participating landowners.' 5" State agencies, however, need not take any actions that
would jeopardize their ability to obtain federal grants, loans or other
funding.' 5 8 Any protection afforded by this provision is clearly contingent upon the agency's ability to protect farmland while remaining eligible for federally funded projects. Furthermore, this
protection is an incongruous benefit to offer solely to land included
in agricultural areas. Given the Commonwealth's concern over the
loss of productive farmland, agency policy should encourage viable
agricultural production wherever possible, not solely in agricultural
areas. This provision attempts to hold out as an incentive a benefit
that all farmers should receive.
(iii) Eminent domain protection.-The Agricultural Area Security Law extends eminent domain protection to land included in
agricultural areas.' 59 No Commonwealth agency, political subdivision, public utility 60 or other body can condemn land contained in
an agricultural area without prior approval from the Agricultural
Lands Condemnation Approval Board. The Board grants such approval only if no reasonable and prudent alternative exists to utilization of land within the agricultural area.1 6 ' Eminent domain
protection can be important to farmers 62 and is properly included in
a program of this type. Eminent domain protection alone, however,
will not provide sufficient incentive to encourage formation of an
agricultural area.
(iv) Purchaseof developmental easements.-The final provision
156. Pennsylvania's new nuisance protection act provides protection from private nuisance actions. Section 954(a) of the new Act states, "No nuisance action shall be brought

against an agricultural operation ..
157.
158.

" Id

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 912 (Purdon Supp. 1983).

Id

159. Id § 912.
160. The Agricultural Area Security Law exempts certain eminent domain actions by public utilities from the Act's approval requirement.
The condemnation approval specified by this subsection shall not be required for an
underground public utility facility or for any facility of an electric cooperative corporation or for any public utility facility the necessity for and propriety and environmental effects of which has been reviewed and ratified or approved by the
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission or the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission.

Id
161. Id § 913(d).
162. Construction of an interstate highway requires forty acres of land for every mile of
roadway. See Schmidt, supra note 49, at 5S8.

of the Agricultural Area Security Law authorizes county govern1 63
ments to institute a program to purchase development easements
for land within an agricultural area." 6 County governments may
use general funds for the purchase of easements or may incur debt to
make funds available. 165 The farmer's acceptance of a county's offer
to purchase an easement is completely voluntary. 166 Thus, the parties must mutually agree on the price of the easement.
Technically, purchase of development easements affords effective protection to participating land. 167 Unfortunately, Pennsylvania's easement purchase provision exceeds the fiscal means of
county government. 68 In fact, in hearings before the federal legislature, the Director of the Pennsylvania Office of State Planning and
Development testified that an effective easement purchase program
163. The Pennsylvania program defines development easement as "[an interest in land,
less than fee simple title (full ownership), which interest represents the inchoate right to develop such lands for residential, commercial, recreational or industrial uses." PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 3, § 903 (Purdon Supp. 1983).
Development easements are understood best by viewing land ownership as a set of rights
or interests. Rights of ownership include: the right to prevent trespass; the right to sell or
bequeath the land; the right to use the property for farming or recreation; the right to build on
or beneath the land. Purchase of a development easement removes the right to build on the
land while leaving the remaining rights intact. PROTECTION OF FARMLAND, supra note 2, at
148.
The price of development easements varies but is analogous to the difference between
market value of land and agricultural use value. For example, if the market price for a given
acre of land is $1000 and the agricultural use value is $200, the farmer would expect $800
compensation for removal of his right to develop the property.
164.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 914 (Purdon Supp. 1983).

165. Id
166. "Nothing in this act shall be construed as to require any owner of land in an agricultuial area to sell or transfer any development easements thereto. An owner may reject any
offer by any official of the county planning commission to purchase any development easements. Id.
167. Following sale of a development easement, the land must remain permanently in
agricultural use. Because the deed to the property contains a record of the easement, all subsequent purchasers take title subject to that restriction. The Agriultural Area Security Law,
however, authorizes local governments to sell the acquired easements upon approval of a majority of the governing body. Conceivably then, a landowner could buy back the easement to
his property by obtaining local government approval. Id
168. Several states in addition to Pennsylania have enacted development easement
purchase programs. See MD. AGRIC. CODE ANN. §§ 2-501 to 2-5 1S (Supp. 1983); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 132A, §§ IIA-I ID; ch. 184, § 31-38 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983).
Suffolk County, New York, enacted an easement purchase program eight years ago. New
Jersey approved and began to implement an easement program in 1976, but terminated the
pilot project before purchase of any easements because of concern over the ultimate cost of
such a program.
Data from these programs enable prediction of the magnitude of ependitures that Pennsylvania counties will encounter. Easement purchases in Suffolk County, New York, required
an average expenditure of $3120 per acre. Massachusetts paid an average price of $1832 per
acre, while Maryland expended $1000 per acre for easement purchases. The estimated cost per
acre for the aborted New Jersey program was $1925. (Figures are through 1980.) PROTECTION
OF FARMLAND, supra, note 2, at 163.
Assuming that the cost estimate for New Jersey's program is indicative of what comparable costs may be in southeastern Pennsylvania, Bucks County will pay over $25 million merely
to purchase easements for 10% of the agricultural land in that county. Chester County can
expect to expend close to $46 million to protect 10% of its farmland. (Figures used to compute
these estimates were taken from EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 82, at 4.)

was beyond the means of state resources and that implementation of
such a program would require federal assistance.' 69 The Agricul-

tural Area Security Law asks county governments to do alone what
state government cannot do without assistance. 7 ° Nevertheless, the
Pennsylvania Legislature made no attempt to provide any state
assistance'' to county easement purchase efforts.
Even if county government could afford easement purchase, lo-

cal politicians would have difficulty justifying the expenditures nec172
essary to protect any appreciable amount of agricultural land.
Further, in the urban-rural fringe areas, where the threat of conversion is greatest, a constituency more concerned with development

than preservation elects county government officials.
Purchase of development easements also raises equity considerations. Easement purchases compensate farmers for the economic
potential lost by restricting land to agricultural production. Yet state
government historically has restricted land use, through its police
power, without payment of compensation. 173 Easement purchases
raise the question whether it is equitable to compensate farmers for
the inability to develop their land when a residential lot owner receives no compensation for his inability to build high-rise apart169. National AgriculturalLand PolicyAct. Hearings on HP 5882 Before the Subcomm.
on Family Farms, Rural Development, and Special Studies, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 93 (1977)
(statement of Jack Brizius, Director of the Pennsylvania Office of State Planning and Development).
The planning director testified as follows:
We believe that there should be a strong state role in the preservation of agricultural
land, but just as firmly we are convinced that it is going to take federal financial help.
We calculate, for example, that to purchase today development rights for merely 10
percent of the prime agricultural land in Pennsylvania will cost us over $800 million.
Id
170. The study conducted by the Office of Planning and Development recommended that
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania provide $500 million to establish an easement purchase
program. LAND POLICY PROGRAM, supra note 14, at 66. The Pennsylvania Legislature chose
to place the burden of financing easement purchases on county government.
171. Maryland provides matching funds (60% state, 40% county) to counties to enable
purchase of development easements. MD. AGRIC. CODE ANN. §§ 2-501 to 2-515 (Supp. 1983).
172. See supra note 168. Interestingly, three of the county legislators who supported a
bond issue to finance the Suffolk County, New York, easement purchase program in 1976 were
voted out of office in 1977. PROTECTION OF FARMLAND, supra note 2, at 164. Voters in Buckingham Township, Bucks County, Pennsylvania, soundly defeated an easement purchase bond
authorization in 1979. This attempt to institute an easement purchase program occurred two
years prior to enactment of the Agricultural Area Security Law, but there is no indication that
the result would be different today.
173. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962), presents an extreme application of police power regulation. A local zoning ordinance forced a quarry owner to discontinue his business. The Supreme Court upheld the ordinance based on the following
reasoning:
Concededly the ordinance completely prohibits a beneficial use to which the property
has previously been devoted. However, such a characterization does not tell us
whether or not the ordinance is unconstitutional. It is an oft-repeated truism that
every regulation necessarily speaks as a prohibition. If this ordinance is otherwise a
valid exercise of the town's police powers, the fact that it deprives the property of its
most beneficial use does not render it unconstitutional.
Id. at 592.

ments.' 7 4 In both circumstances restrictions prevent the highest
economic use of the land but allow the landowner a reasonable use
of the property. 17 ' Accordingly, the propriety and practicality of
easement purchase as a farmland preservation tool is difficult to substantiate because of the equity considerations and extreme ependitures involved.
(c) Limitations to effectiveness of the Act. -In addition to
problems presented by specific provisions of the Agricultural Area
Security Law, the program as a whole contains several flaws that
may limit effectiveness. The law makes creation of an agricultural
area procedurally difficult and time consuming.' 7 6 The lack of substantive incentives offered to farmers to encourage formation of agricultural areas magnifies the procedural burden. Effectiveness is
further undermined because farmers sacrifice little by withdrawing
from an agricultural area. Presently, farmers incur absoluetely no
penalty for withdrawal from an established agricultural area.' 7 7
The Agricultural Area Security Law is an inadequate measure
to prevent agricultural land conversion. The protection offered to
landowners is minimal,17 8 and the procedure to create an area is burdensome. 179 Once an area is created, no mechanim exists to prevent
withdrawal from the program or conversion of land to a nonagricultural use. Purchase of development easements could guarantee continued agricultural use of limited amounts of land, but the economic
and political costs' 8° are prohibitive, and systematic compensation
for restricted land use raises serious equity considerations. 181
(d) Toward a sound districtingprogram.-A properly designed
agricultural area or districting program would aid the preservation
of farmland. The concept of encouraging farmers to cooperate by
forming districts is sound. Group action helps communities recognize the negative factors affecting agriculture and enables farmers to
address local government issues in a more unified manner. A districting program that offers a diverse package of benefits 82 promotes
174. Zoning schemes universally limit the uses permitted in a particular district. For instance, a zoning ordinance may prohibit gas stations or high rise apartments in a residential
district even when these uses constitute the property's highest economic use. Landowners receive no compensation for sacrificing their right to build apartment buildings. See infra notes
225-43 and accompanying text.
175.

Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 909(b) (Purdon Supp. 1983).
See supra notes 155-71 and accompanying text.
See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 16S-72 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 287-96 and accompanying text.

a greater feeling of security among farmers and encourages continued investment in farm operations.
Land use regulation operates on three levels.' 83 Zoning

84

most

policies185

and public
directly influences land use, but property tax
t
6
investment decisions 1 also play an important role. Several state
districting programs 87 take advantage of these indirect influences by
protecting agricultural areas or districts from public investment that
would tend to facilitate conversion of agricultural land.188 A developer's awareness that public sewer and water facilities will not extend into an agricultural area may persuade him to locate his
development elsewhere. The Pennsylvania program contains no
such provision to protect agricultural areas from negative public
investments.
A sound districting program also has political appeal. Farmer
89
participation is voluntary and thus not subject to controversy.
Additionally, deletion of easement purchase provisions' 90 allows creation of agricultural areas at little expense to local government
units.' 9'
Agricultural districting or creation of agricultural areas presents
a moderate approach to farmland preservation; thus, effectively conceived and implemented legislation should result in a moderate increase in the viability of farm operations. 92 Districting programs,
because of their voluntary nature, do not offer strong protection to
183. Myers, The Legal Aspects of Agricultural Districting, 55 IND. L.J. 1 (1979-80).
184. For a discussion of agricultural land preservation through zoning, see infra notes 193276 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 81-119 and accompanying text.
186. Public investment decisions include placement and improvement of roads, construction of sewer and water faciilities and location of subsidized housing projects. PROTECTION OF
FARMLAND, supra note 2, at 80.
187. See N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 305.4 (McKinney Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 15.]1512) (Cumm. Supp. 1982).
188. Public agencies in Virginia must give 30 days notice of proposed expenditures to the
local governing body of the agricultural area. The agency then must justify the expenditure
and evaluate alternatives having less impact on agricultural land. The local government body
has authority to veto the expenditure. VA. CODE § 15:1-1512(D) (Cumin. Supp. 1983).
189. In a districting program, farmers receive benefits without making commitments in
return. The program imposes no restrictions on land and farmers can withdraw from agricultural areas without imposition of penalties.
190. Tapayers negatively perceive the economic costs of easement purchase provisions.
See supra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
191. Agricultural districting programs require minimal supervision from the coordinating
state agencies because local governnents already possess the necessary procedural structure.
Although tax related relief measures may involve a degree of tax shifting, most states already
employ some form of differential assessment program that creates the same difficulties. See
supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
192. Agricultural districts do not seek to prevent conversion of farmland. Rather, these
programs function to make agriculture more viable and to remove government imposed impediments to efficient farm practices. As an administrator of the New York districting program noted, "agricultural districts are not a preservation tool per se. They are not out to
preserve agriculture forever. They are just trying to make it more feasible to remain in farming." PROTECTION OF FARMLAND, supra note 2, at 92.

lands under intense urban pressures. The concepts involved in districting, however, can play a significant role in an integrated land

preservation program.
B.

Local Government Land Use Control-

Zoning

Pennsylvania statewide agricul1. Zoning Techniques.-All
tural land preservation measures involve voluntary commitment by
farmers and do not provide mandatory restriction of land use. Local
government measures, by contrast, impose mandatory restrictions on
the permitted use of private land.' 9 3 Zoning ordinances, the major

tool of local government land use control, divides land into districts
and then regulates the land uses permitted in each district.' 94 Local
government units employ two different zoning techniques to preserve agricultural land. The first approach restricts land uses permitted in designated districts. This approach prohibits the construction
of nonfarm dwellings in exclusive farm use districts. 95 Pennsylvania, however, does not employ exclusive agricultural zoning.
The second approach relies on carefully drafted standards 9 6
that regulate permitted uses and consequently, encourage agricul-

tural production. These nonexclusive zoning schemes, do not prohibit nonfarm uses but render such uses highly impractical.
Nonexclusive zoning plans attempt to preserve agricultural land by
preventing division of large blocks of farmland into small lots suited

for residential purposes.197 These plans employ three different techniques to maintain the necessary large blocks of agricultural land.
193. Local government zoning authority derives from a delegation of the state's police
power. See Kline v. City of Harrisburg, 362 Pa. 438, 68 A.2d 182 (1949). The Pennsylvania
Legislature specifically authorized local government zoning to protect agricultural land. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10603(b) (Purdon Supp. 1983) provides, "Zoning ordinances may contain:. . .Provisions for the protection and preservation of natural resources and agricultural
land and activities.
194.
Zoning is the process by which a municipality legally controls the use which may be
made of property and the physical configuration of development upon tracts of land
within its jurisdiction. Zoning ordinances are adopted to divide the land into different districts, and to permit only certain uses within each zoning district.
1 P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § ].02 (rev. perm. ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited
as ROHAN].

195. Exclusive agricultural zoning ordinances usually contain three common characteristics: (1)absolute prohibition of nonfarm dwellings; (2) use of a performance definition of
farming rather than an acreage based definition; and (3) an individual evaluation of each
proposed farm dwelling. PROTECTION OF FARMLAND, supra note 2, at 122.

196. A zoning plan typically includes the following elements:
(1)a statement of purpose;
(2) a list of uses permitted in particular districts;
(3) a list of special uses and considerations for special uses;
(4) standards that govern the permitted or approved uses; and
(5) a map of the district.
Id at 107. Exclusive zoning schemes regulate land use by restricting the second element.
Nonexclusive plans influence land use by manipulating the fourth element.
197. PROTECTION OF FARMLAND, supra note 2, at 112.

(a) Large minimum lot size. - Political subdivisions often impose large minimum lot sizes 198 to encourage continued agricultural
use. 199 For example, a zoning ordinance may require a minimum lot
size of forty acres for a single dwelling. 2" Such lot sizes permit a
few large nonagricultural estates but make concentrated residential

development impossible.2"' Farming is the only viable use of the
land when zoning prohibits small lot subdivision.
(b) Fixed area-based allocation.-Under the popular zoning
device styled fixed area-based allocation, the number of dwelling
units permitted on a particular tract of land is directly proportional
to the total size of the tract.2" 2 Thus if an ordinance specifies that

one dwelling unit may be built for every twenty acres contained in
the tract of land, a landowner with a one hundred acre tract may

construct five dwelling units. Fixed area-based allocation systems
usually contain provisions that encourage clustering of the permitted
dwelling units on one small area of the property, leaving a large unbroken block of land for agricultural use.20 3
(c) Sliding scale area-basedallocation.-The

third nonexclu-

sive zoning scheme employed to preserve agricultural land is slidingscale area-based allocation. 2" Under this technique, the density
(dwelling unit per acre) of peritted dwellings varies inversely to the
total amount of acreage. 20 5 This scheme, based upon the recognition
198. One standard commonly included in a zoning provision is specification of the minimum lot size required to accommodate one dwelling unit. Residential districts usually allow
1/4 acre or 1/2 acre lot sizes.
199. See infra note 201 and accompanying text.
200.
Minimum lot sizes range from 10 acres (for a truck farming area) to 640 acres (for an
area where rangeland is dominant). The median lot size for 45 ordinances studied is
40 acres, and over 3/5 of them had minimum lot sizes ranging from 35 to 40 acres.
Generally the minimum lot size is related to the typical size of commercial farms in
the jurisdiction.
PROTECTION OF FARMLAND, supra note 2, at 112.
201. Planners design lot sizes to provide the minimum size necessary for viable commercial farming. Large lot sizes render development of residential dwellings uneconomical. Moderate increases in lot size, however, actually remove land from agricultural production. If lot
size is raised from 1/2 acre to three acres, residential housing merely spreads to cover a larger
area. Moreover, the slight increase in lot size will not deter residential use of the land.
202. The number of dwelling units permitted in fixed area-based allocation ranges from
one unit per ten acres to one unit per 160 acres. Pennsylvania townships use a figure of one
dwelling unit per 25 acres. PROTECTION OF FARMLAND, supra note 2, at 117.
203. Communities encourage clustering of permitted dwelling units by setting a minimum
and maximum size for building lots. An ordinance may permit four dwelling units on 100
acres while specifying that each dwelling unit occupy no more than two acres. This provision
allows additional dwelling units but leaves large blocks of land available for farming. Id
204. Sliding scale area based allocation was developed initially in York County, Pennsylvania, in 1974. W. TONER, SAVING FARMS AND FARMLAND:

A COMMUNITY GUIDE 16

(1978).
205. The sliding scale area based allocation ordinance in Peach Bottom Township, Pennsylvania allows dwelling units based upon the following scale:
Number of Dwelling Units Permitted
Size of Trace
1
0-7 A cres .............................
2
7-30 ..................................

that the larger a block of land, the greater the need to prevent con-

version to nonagricultural use, 206 often provides that permitted
dwelling units be clustered on nonproductive land.2 °7
All three nonexclusive zoning schemes permit farmers to engage

in some nonagricultural development and, in this respect, are less
harsh than imposition of exclusive farm use districts.20 8 Each tech-

nique, however, prevents a farmer from attaining the highest economic use of his property. 2°
2. Legal Challenges to Zoning.-Zoning laws frequently clash
with traditional notions of the rights inherent in the ownership of
land. Landowners feel that title to property carries an unlimited
right to determine use of the land. Zoning conflicts directly with this
unlimitedrights view of ownership. 210 Local government zoning regulations dictate the permitted uses of private property.21 1 Conse30-80 .................................
3
80-130 ................................
4
130-180 ...............................
5
etc.
Maximum density is one dwelling unit per one acre (a one acre tract is allowed one dwelling
unit). A 180 acre lot could have a density as low as one dwelling unit per 36 acres (5 units
allowed/180 acres = one unit per 36 acres). As the size of a tract increases, density of dwelling
units decreases, thus preserving large blocks of land for agricultural purposes. Id. at 17.
206.
The rationale supporting the inverse relationship between size of a landholding and
permitted density is intriguing. Large landholdings must be retained in agricultural
use if the community is to retain its agricultural base. Smaller holdings like 10 or 20
acres are less critical to the future of the agricultural base. Further, large landowners
are more likely to be committed to agriculture than are the owners of ranchettes or
mini-farms. Therefore, the sliding scale is a good compromise, a good method to
meet the needs of large and small landowners alike.
Id at 15.
207. The Peach Bottom ordinance requires that "residential lots shall be located on the
least agriculturally productive land feasible, ...
to minimize interference with agricultural
production." Id. at 17.
The ordinance also sets a minimum and maximum building lot size. Agricultural Preservation zoning ordinances impose maximum lot sizes to deter creation of "farmettes" that unproductively occupy large amounts of farmland. See supra note 203.
208. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
209. The financial return realized by selling 200 1/2 acre lots is considerably greater than
the return realized on four small lots located on rocky soil.
210. "Zoning is the process by which a municipality legally controls the use which may be
made of private property." ROHAN, supra note 194, at § 1.02.
The following excerpt aptly describes the conflict between private ownership and public
zoning regulation:
For over a century it was the law of this Commonwealth that every person in the
United States of America had a Constitutionally ordained right to own, possess, protect and use his property in any way he desired, so long as it did not injure or adversely affect the health or morals or safety of others. . . . Then along came
"zoning" with its desirable and worthwhile objectives. The result was that all the
aforesaid basic fundamental rights of an owner of property were restricted by a Judicially created higher right, namely, the general welfare of the people of that
community.
Concord Township Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 480, 268 A.2d 765, 771 (1970) (Bell, C.J., concurring).
211. Id

quently, many landowners challenge zoning ordinances that reduce
the value of their property.
(a) Properpurposeoflocalgovernment regulation.-Analysis of
the validity of a zoning ordinance begins with a determination of the

local governing body's authority to enact the measure.21 2 Generally,
municipalities possess only those powers granted to them by the
state.21 3 Thus, the initial question that arises is whether preservation

of agricultural land is a proper purpose of local government action.
Some states leave this determination to the courts2 14 while others,

including Pennsylvania, amend their zoninq enabling legislation to
provide specifically for farmland preservation.21 5 Under either
method, courts have concluded that zoning to preserve agricultural
land is a proper function of local government.21 6
(b) Relationship of means of regulationto local governmentpurpose. -A court reviewing a zoning ordinance next must determine
whether the means chosen to preserve agriculture are rationally related to the governmental goal. At this juncture, some of the innova-

tive nonexclusive zoning schemes used to preserve agricultural land
run into difficulty. 17 Pennsylvania courts, in particular, closely examine the relationship between the stated goal and the means chosen
to accomplish that goal.2"' In National Land and Investment Company v. Easttown Township Board ofAdjustment, 2 19 the Pennsylania
Supreme Court invalidated an ordinance that imposed a four acre
minimum lot size despite the township's argument that the ordinance
created a greenbelt and thus preserved agricultural land.22 0 The
court disposed of this argument by commenting that, although open
space preservation was a legitimate goal, the four acre lot size was
212. See infra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
213. The limited-authority concept of local government is known as "Dillon's Rule,"
named in honor of the noted authority on municipal corporations. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court expressed this rule as follows:
Nothing is better settled than that a municipal corporation does not possess and cannot exercise any other than the following powers: (1) those granted in express words;
(2) those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted;
(3) those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation, not simply
convenient but indispensable.
Kline v. City of Harrisburg, 362 Pa. 438, 442, 68 A.2d 182, 187 (1949).
214. For state decisions holding agricultural land preservation a proper purpose of local
government, see Gisler v. County of Maders, 38 Cal. App. 2d 303, 112 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1974); In
re Spring Valley Dev. Corp., 300 A.2d 736 (Me. 1973).
215. See supra note 193; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A55D-2 (West Supp. 1983).
216. See supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 200-207 and accompanying text.
218. See infra notes 219-24 and accompanying text.
219. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
220. Easttown Township also argued that the four acre lot minimum was necessary to
ensure adequate sewage disposal, decrease road traffic, preserve the character of the area and
present historic sites within the township in a proper setting. Id at 525-30, 215 A.2d at 608-12.

not a reasonable method of achieving that end.2 2 ' In addition, in
November 1982 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held unconstitutional a Hopewell Township ordinance specifically designed to preserve agricultural land. 222 The court held that the zoning measures
employed by the township were more restrictive than necessary to
preserve agricultural land.223

(c)

The "taking" issue.-Following determination that an ordi-

nance is rationally related to a legitimate state interest, the court
must decide whether the restriction imposed by the oridinance constitutes a "taking" of the landowner's property.2 24 The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution states that "private property
221. The NationalLand court found the ordinance poorly suited to preservation of open
space. The court suggested cluster zoning and condemnation of development easements as
more efficient alternatives. The court noted that the township's assertion that the ordinance
preserved open space conflicted with the township's argument that a ready market existed for
four acre lots. Id. at 529, 215 A.2d at 610.
222. Hopewell Township Bd. of Supervisors v. Golla, - Pa. -, 452 A.2d 1337 (1982).
The challenged ordinance allowed development of no more than five additional residential
dwellings on a lot regardless of the size of the original tract. The ordinance also contained
maximum building lot provisions designed to cluster additional residences on unproductive
ground. See supra note 203.
In striking the Hopewell ordinance, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court described the analysis applied in determining validity of zoning measures. The court explained that requirements
of substantive due process necessitated a balancing of landowner's rights against the public
interest sought to be protected by the challenged ordinance. Id. at -, 452 A.2d at 1341. The
court noted, however, that an ordinance must accord "substantial deference" to the preservation of rights of property owners, and alternatively, that a land use restriction would survive
scrutiny only if it is "clearly necessary to protect the health or safety or morals or general
welfare of the people." Id. at -, 452 A.2d at 1342.
Although the court acknowledged the worthwhile nature of agricultural land preservation, Hopewell's ordinance failed the balancing test. The court found that "the restrictions on
landowner rights imposed by the ordinance in question were too severe to be regarded as
'clearly necessary.'" Id at -, 452 A.2d at 1343. The ordinance fell, not becuse it failed to
preserve farmland, but because it failed to preserve farmland by the least restrictive means.
The Hopewell decision does not bode well for zoning measures designed to preserve agricultural land. The court could have invalidated the specific ordinance involved on narrower
grounds, yet chose to apply due process standards to the farmland preservation measure. The
court also found the ordinance to be arbitrary and discriminatory as applied to different landowners; by grounding its decision on this discriminatory impact, the court could have avoided
balancing. Id. at -, 452 A.2d at 1343. The Hopewell opinion indicates that preservation of
farmland is not accorded great weight when balanced against private ownership rights. That
unsettling conclusion is inescapable when the following language is considered: "[Tihe public
interest in preventing irretrievable loss of agricultural land does not presently warrant overriding appellees' interest in using the land in a less restricted manner, including their right to use
property in less than the most efficient manner." Id at -, 452 A.2d at 1343.
Further, the court did not address the township's argument that the ordinance was purposely designed to afford greater protection to larger tracts of agricultural land than to smaller
tracts. Larger landholdings must be maintained to ensure a continuing agricultural base.
Owners of large tracts are more likely to be committed to agricultural operations than owners
of farmettes. See also supra note 206 and accompanying text.
223. The commonwealth court invalidated the Hopewell ordinance on slightly different
reasoning. Hopewell Township Bd. of Supervisors v. Golla, 58 Pa. Commw. 572, 428 A.2d 701
(1981). The commonwealth court held that placing a numerical limitation on the number of
dwellings permitted, without regard to the size of the tract produced "variant results [that] lack
rational relationship to the purpose of preserving prime agricultural land." Id at S80, 428 A.24
at 704. See alo Appeal of Buckingham Developers, Inc., 61 Pa. Commw. 408, 433 A.2d 931
(1981).
224. See infra notes 225-43 and accompanying text.

[shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation. '
Before 1922 courts interpreted this provision as applying only to situations in which a government body actually condemned land for
public use. 2 26 Then, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mfahon, 2 27 the

United States Supreme Court held that a taking could result from
legislative or regulatory action even when no physical invasion of
the property occurred.228 Consequently, courts now must determine
when a zoning ordinance ceases to operate as a valid police power

restriction and becomes a compensable taking of private property.
Although both state and federal courts have addressed this issue,
neither system has developed a set formula for determining when a
taking occurs. 2 29 Instead, courts have developed and applied various
flexible tests. The most common approach used to determine when a
property taking occurs involves a balancing of the ordinance's economic impact with the legitimacy of the objective sought by the regulation.2 3 ° Courts evaluate economic impact either by considering
the amount of dimunition in property value caused by the ordi-

nance 23 1 or by determining whether a reasonable use of the property
remains after restriction.2 3 2

Two recent Supreme Court decisions aid in predicting whether
restrictive agricultural zoning ordinances will withstand a taking
challenge. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York, 23 3 the Court held that determination of the taking issue turns
234
upon an examination of (1) the nature of the governmental action
and (2) the nature and extent of interference with the landowner's
225. U.S. CONST. amend V.
226. Until 1922 courts applied the fifth amendment compensation requirement to formal
condemnation actions by government bodies. See Supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
227. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
228. In Mahon, a coal company claimed that a Pennsylvania statute (the Kohler Act)
destroyed mining rights in property that the company had sold conditioned on retention of
subsurface rights. The Supreme Court found the statute constituted a taking of the company's
property without compensation. Id
229. Several studies attempting to identify a numerical formula for the amount of loss
required to constitute a taking have proved inconclusive. Reductions in value caused by valid
ordinances were similar to losses resulting from ordinances struck as unconstitutional. Duerksen, ConstitutionalIssues In Land Use Law- The Taking Issue, in LAND USE LAW: ISSUES FOR
THE EIGHTIES 200 (E. Netter ed. 1981).
230. See Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d
381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 C1976), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976).
231. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (ordinance upheld
despite reduction of property value from $10,000 to $2500); William C. Haas & Co. v. City and
County of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117 (9th Cir. 1979) (reduction in property value from $2
million to $100,000 did not constitute taking).
232. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
233. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
234. Government action designed to protect against public harm seldom constitutes a taking. Id at 124. Nevertheless the government must provide a compensation whenever acquiring property to perform a public function or to provide a public benefit. See Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). (Government attempts to force public access to private
pond constitutes a taking.

property rights. 235 The Court concluded that diminishment or destruction of property interests resulting from government regulation
designed to protect public health, safety, 'morals or general welfare
does not constitute a taking. 236 The Court further held that removal
of the property's most beneficial use would not constitute a taking
when other uses remained.237
In Agins v. City of Tiburan, 238 a developer attacked a city ordinance designed to preserve open space. The developer claimed that
the ordinance, which limited development of his five acre lot to five
single family houses, deprived him of his right to build apartment
units and thus constituted a taking of his property. 239 The Court
disagreed and reasoned that since the ordinance pursued the legitimate interest of preserving open space 2 ' and did not deprive the
developer of all uses of the land, the restrictions did not constitute a
taking. 241' These two holdings support the validity of zoning to preserve agricultural land and recognize farmland preservation as a legitimate local government purpose.24 2 Further, zoning to preserve
agricultural land necessarily leaves landowners with at least one viable use for the property. That use is, of course, farming.
(d) The exclusionary zoning doctrine.-In

most states, zoning

ordinances are declared valid when they clear the taking hurdle. In
Pennsylvania and a few other northeastern states, 243 however, courts
continue the analysis by determining whether the ordinance has an
235. When governmental action prohibits only the most beneficial use of land, the action
does not constitute a taking per se. Regulatory action that completely destroys a recognized
property right, however, may constitute a taking. 438 U.S. at 124-28.
236. Id at 124-25.
237. Id at 124-27.
238. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
239. The developer bought land intending to build multifamily apartment units. Subsequent passage of a zoning ordinance restricted that land to single family residential or open
space use. Id
240. Id at 261.
241. Id at 261-63.
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has ruled as procedurally improper an aggrieved landowner's attempt to seek compensation for an alleged taking resulting from enactment of a zoning ordinance. Wyoming Borough v. Wyco Realty Co., 64 Pa. Commw. 459, 440
A.2d 696 (1982). The landowner must attack the validity of the zoning measure, not seek
compensation for the restrictions imposed. This procedural mandate arises from the court's
distinction between the exercise of police power and the exercise of eminent domain. Id at
462, 440 A.2d at 697. See also Gaebel v. Thornbury Township, 8 Pa. Commw. 399, 303 A.2d
57 (1973).
242. See supra notes 214-15.
243. To date, courts in New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania have recognized exclusionary zoning concepts. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 801 (1975); Berenson v. Town of
New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975).
Several major differences exist between exclusionary zoning challenges in New Jersey and
Pennsylvania. New Jersey courts consider the motive of the zoning authority; in Pennsylvania,
exclusionary intent is not an element essential in proving an ordinance invalid. In addiition in
New Jersey only large municipalities that can greatly affect regional development are examined for exclusionary practices. Pennsylvania courts require all communities, large and

exclusionary effect on regional development. 2 " Pennsylvania bases
its anticlusionary zoning doctrine upon the recognition that local
government sometimes use zoning regulations to exclude development of low and moderate income housing.24 5 Surrick v. Zoning
Hearing Board246 sets forth the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's approach to exclusionary zoning determinations. A court using this
method first determines whether the community in question is "a
logical area for development and population growth. '24 7 Upon finding the municipality to be a logical choice for urban growth, the
court then examines the ordinance to determine whether any provisions are exclusionary and without substantial relationship to the
public health, safety and general welfare.2 48 The courts expect local
government units to consider regional welfare in planning decisions
and to provide a "fair share" of the development necessary to meet
regional housing demands.24 9
The goals promoted by the antiexclusionary zoning doctrine appear to conffict with agricultural land preservation efforts on the rural-urban fringe.2 5 ° Satisfying regional development needs,
however, is not incompatible with preserving farmland. Judicial enforcement of the antiexclusionary doctrine forces municipalities to
formulate plans that address the dual requirements of preservation
and growth. 25' These local government units must institute efficient
land use plans that not only protect important agricultural lands but
also provide for orderly community growth. The judiciary thus is
mandating responsible, comprehensive planning by local
government.
(e) Recommendations to local government. -The cases discussed above indicate that, while courts subject zoning ordinances to
close examination, a well designed agricultural zoning plan can survive judicial scrutiny.25 2 The holdings also suggest certain steps local government units can take to minimize the potency for judicial
small, to accept a fair share of regional development. Appeal of Elocin, Inc., 66 Pa. Commw.
28, 443 A.2d 1333 (1982).
244. See infra notes 245-51.
245. See Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 476 Pa. 182, 382 A.2d 105 (1977).
246. 476 Pa. 182, 382 A.2d 105 (1977).
247. Id at 192, 382 A.2d at 110.
248. Id at 191, 382 A.2d at 109-10.
249. The Surrick court did not provide any guidance to local governments to enable them
to determine what constitutes "fair share." Id at 194, 382 A.2d at 110-11.
250. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court relied on the antiexclusionary zoning doctrine to invalidate a township ordinance purportedly designed to preserve agricultural land. In
re Application of Wetherill, 45 Pa. Commw. 303, 406 A.2d 827 (1979). In Wetherill however,
the township zoning plan contained no provision for multi-family dwellings and set aside very
little land for single family homes on small lots.
251. Courts more readily accept agricultural preservation provisions adopted pursuant to
a comprehensive plan that provides for accommodation of the community's growth needs. Id
252. See supra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.

invalidation of zoning measures. Thus, an ordinance should state
clearly that its purpose is to preserve agricultural land. 253 The governing body will receive little sympathy from the court if justification

for the zoning restriction does not appear until after a challenge to
the ordinance arises.2 54
Next, the local body must recognize that moderation often is not
the best policy. A forty acre minimum lot size may have a better

chance of validation than a four acre minimum. 2 " Courts are aware
that four acre lots will not sustain viable agricultural production and
consequently, will find such a scheme not reasonably related to the
stated purpose of preserving farmland. 2 6 Further, the court may de-

termine that the four acre plan was simply a means of excluding low
and moderate income housing.25 7 The forty acre minimum lot size,
however, better preserves farmland and therefore bears a substantial
relationship to protecting the "public health, safety and general welfare."25' 8 Thus, the court may decide that the public interest served
by the forty acre minimum outweighs the exclusionary effect of the
ordinance.2 59
Local government can lessen further the possibility that a zoning scheme will be deemed exclusionary by making agricultural zoning provisions part of a comprehensive community plan that
includes projected growth figures and provides development areas
sufficient to accommodate the projected growth.2 60 Courts in Pennsylvania will invalidate ordinances that purport to preserve agricultural land but fail to provide for multifamily dwellings and small lot
single family homes.26 1
Local government also can take steps to assure that zoning ordinances do not succumb to the taking challenge. The decisions in
253. One of the common elements of a zoning plan is a statement of purpose. See supra
note 196. A well-drafted statement of purpose should set forth precisely the goals to be accomplished by the zoning ordinance.
254. See National Land and Investment Company v. Easttown Township, 419 Pa. 504,
215 A.2d 597 (1965). In National Land, the township attempted to justify the suspect ordinance after challenge. The court carefully scrutinized the township's justification and pointed
out conflicting purposes the township sought to accomplish. See supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
255. Courts universally require that land use provisions rationally relate to a legitimate
goal. See supra notes 217-23. A four acre minimum lot size is not a rational means of preserving farmland because farmers cannot maintain viable agricultural operations on a four acre
plot. A forty acre minimum, however, Provides sufficient land to sustain commercial farm
operations. See supra note 222.
256. See, e.g., National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597
(1965); Hopewell Township Bd. of Supervisors v. Golla, 58 Pa. Commw. 572, 428 A.2d 701
(1981); In re Wetherill, 45 Pa. Commw. 303, 406 A.2d S27 (1979).
257. See In re Wetherill, 45 Pa. Commw. 303, 406 A.2d 827 (1979).
258. Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 476 Pa. 182, 382 A.2d 105 (1977).
259. Id Pennsylvania recognizes preservation of agricultural land as a legitimate purpose
of local government. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
260. Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 476 Pa. 182, 194, 382 A.2d 105, 110-11 (1977).
261. See supra notes 250-51 and accompanying text.

Penn Central TransportationCo. v. City of New York 2 62 and Agins v.
City of Tihuran263 support zoning efforts to preserve agricultural

land when those measures allow landowners to retain some viable

use of their property. 264 Armed with these decisions, local governments need only refrain from making irrational designations of agricultural zones. A taking may occur when municipalities zone land
with steep slopes or rocky terrain for agricultural use.2 61 Indeed, local planners, rather than imposing restrictions that prevent viable
use, should reserve areas unsuited for agricultural production to accommodate necessary developmental growth.
(/9 Advantages of zoning as afarmlandpreservationmeasure.Zoning, as a tool of agricultural land preservation, has numerous

advantages over the above-discussed programs. Land use restriction
does not rely on voluntary compliance by those affected and does not

require implementation of incentive provisions. Zoning achieves the
level of protection provided by purchase of development easements, 2 66 but does not require multibillion dollar expenditures. 2 67
Further, local government historically has regulated land use to prevent public harm.2 68
Strict zoning regulations designed to protect farmland may reduce the market value of agricultural properties substantially; 269
market value, however, often decreases when society seeks to prevent public harm by restricting permitted land use. 27° The same
principle applies whether in reference to stone quarries 27' or to farmland. Ownership of property does not include an unlimited right to
272
put that land to its highest and best economic use.
Zoning effectively preserves agricultural land. Furthermore, in262. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). See supra notes 2S3-37 and accompanying text.
263. 447 U.S. 255 (19G0). See supra notes 238-42 and accompanying text.
264. Agins, 447 U.S. at 261-63.
265. In Smeja v. County of Boone, 34 Ill. App. 3d 628, 339 N.E.2d 452 (1975), the court
invalidated a county ordinance that zoned 50 acres of forest and submarginal land for agricultural use. The court ruled that the ordinance "bore no real or substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals, comfort or general welfare." Id. at 630, 339 N.E.2d at 454.
266. See supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
268. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 Q1926). See also supra
note 173 and accompanying text.
269. Reduction in the market value of farmland results from an inability to utilize strictly
zoned agricultural aland for residential development purposes. Theoretically, the price of land
under restrictive zoning should decrease to agricultural use value. See supra note 163.
270. See, e.g., William C. Haas & Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117
(9th Cir. (1979) (value of land reduced from $2 million to $100,000).
271. In Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962), a local zoning ordinance
forced the closing of a quarry that had operated for 30 years at the same location.
272. The Goldblatt court noted: "It is an oft-repeated truism that every regulation necessarily speaks as a prohibition. If this ordinance is otherwise a valid exercise of the town's
police powers, the fact that it deprives the property of its most beneficial use does not render it
unconstitutional." Id. at 592.

tegration of zoning measures into a comprehensive preservation plan
reduces the harsh economic impact on farmers.2 73 In fact, when substantial incentives are at stake, farmers actually promote restrictive
land use controls.274
V. Recommendations
The most grievous fault of Pennsylvania's attempt to encourage
preservation of farmland is the legislative failure to promulgate an
integrated program; the present system consists only of various agricultural land preservation provisions that operate independently.

The Agricultural Area Security Law275 indicates a minor attempt at

integration. The program, however, provides inadequate incentives
to encourage participation.276 Because Pennsylvania's measures focus on encouragement of agricultural viability through provision of
incentives, none of the purported preservation measures provide for
mandatory restriction of agricultural land. In urban-rural fringe areas, the incentives offered by the state are meager compared to the
financial gain realized by sale of farmland for development purposes.277 Finally, the Commonwealth implements the one device
that offers permanent protection to farmland, purchase of development easements, in a way that precludes effective utilization.278
bears the cost of that prohibitively expensive
County government
279
program.

Local government efforts to protect farmland have not achieved
a significantly higher degree of success. Some local government
units have designed and implemented innovative zoning measures
that have the potential for preserving farmland.28 ° Conversely, other
municipalities flounder with ineffective zoning schemes or no zoning
at all. 28 ' Many zoning plans purposely have attempted to exclude,
273. See infra notes 311-13 and accompanying text.
274. See infra notes 315-16 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 144-72 and accompanying text. The Agricultural Area Security Law
offers four benefits to farmers participating in agricultural areas. Farmland districting laws
depend upon broad packages of benefits to encourage voluntary participation. See supra notes
186-92 and accompanying text.
276. See discussion of nuisance protection, supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text;
discussion of eminent domain, supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text; discussion of limitations on state agencies, supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text; and discussion of easement
purchase, supra notes 163-71 and accompanying text.
277. Completely incentive-based programs attempt to make farming economically competitive with alternative uses. In predominately rural areas, where development demand for
land is low, incentives may make farming sufficiently attractive to compete with the minimal
demand for development uses. Conversely, in urban-fringe areas, demand pressure drives
land values so high that the minor economic advantage produced by agricultural incentives are
not competitive at all.
278. See supra notes 163-73 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
280. Local government zoning efforts in York County and Bucks County, Pennsylvania,
have been particularly impressive. See supra notes 202-07 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 250-51 and accompanying text.

or simply have failed to consider, future development needs of the
community and of the region."' 2 In addition, the state has failed to

articulate a strong policy in favor of zoning to protect agricultural
land and has not mandated or even encouraged comprehensive planning by localities. Court decisions also reflect the tentative nature of
the legislature's support for local government efforts. Pennsylvania's
judiciary accords less sympathy to zoning measures designed to protect agricultural land than do courts in other states.2 83

Clearly, there is a potency for improvement in Pennsylvania's
approach to agricultural land preservation. Efforts to improve the
program could take several different forms. The program could continue its current emphasis on voluntary incentives with revisions to
coordinate the incentives into a cohesive program. 284 Alternatively,
Pennsylvania could institute a farmland preservation program in
which incentives provided by the Commonwealth would be contin-

gent upon the imposition of effective land use restrictions.285
Either approach predicates success upon legislative recognition
of the inherent difficulties of farmland preservation. A successful
program must reconcile the farmer's ownership rights with society's
need to ensure a sufficient supply of agricultural land. The program
also must address development needs concurrently with preservation. Finally, the legislature must recognize that mere preservation
of land will accomplish little if farm operations cease to be economi-

cally viable.28 6
A.

Revision of Current Pennsylvania Measures

Pennsylvania can improve its farmland preservation program
simply by applying already enacted measures more effectively. The
Agricultural Area Security Law can improve the viability of farming
and the expectations of farmers by offering a broader package of
incentives to encourage participation. To reach this end, the legislature could make the special sewer and water assessment provision,

currently available to all farmers, 287 contingent upon participation in
282. See Discussion of exclusionary zoning, supra note 243-51 and accompanying text.
283. State governments in both Oregon and California have articulated strong support for
zoning measures designed to preserve farmland. Consequently, courts in these states seldom
strike agricultural zoning ordiances. See Helix Land Co. v. City of San Diego, 82 Cal. App. 3d
932, 147 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1978); Gisler v. County of Madera, G8 Cal. App. 2d 303, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 919 (1974); Joyce v. city of Portland 24 Or. App. 689, 546 P.2d 1100 (1976)
284. See infra notes 287-96 and accompanying text.
285. See infra notes 304-21 and accompanying text.
286. States can prohibit development of agricultural land but cannot force landowners to
engage in agricultural operations. Thus, land preservation programs also must take steps to
enhance the viability of farming.
287. Pennsylvania maintains a special sewer and water farmland assessment program independent of the Agricultural Area Security Law. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 1241-1243 (Purdon Supp. 1983). This special assessment provision exempts qualified farmland from
assessments for public facilities that do not directly benefit agricultural land. Id

an agricultural area. Admittedly, this simple change will not cause
farmers immediately to join agricultural areas, but such a change
will provide an additional reason to consider joining.28
Similarly, Pennsylvania should add protection against public
investments that encourage conversion of farmland.289 Inclusion of
this particular protection in the Agricultural Area package is benefi-

cial for two reasons. First, limitation of public investment demonstrates that state and local governments consider maintenance of the
area for agricultural production a serious matter. Second, a declared
policy of public investment restraints discourages farmers from with-

drawing from the agricultural area.290 Any farmer participating in
an agricultural area may reconsider withdrawing and developing his
land when he first considers that local government will not extend
public sewer, water and transportation facilities to the property.
Further, commercial developers will hesitate to buy land that stands
little chance of receiving public improvements. 29 '
The Pennsylvania program also should use differential taxation
measures to greater advantage. Relief from property taxes can increase substantially the viability of agriculture.2 9 2 Consequently, the
legislature should not make this relief contingent solely upon participation in an agricultural area. A less repressive way exists, however,
to use differential taxation to increase land preservation effectiveness. Pennsylvania should make differential assessment valuation
available only to farmers who either are located in a municipality
that has adopted a comprehensive development plan or participate
in an agricultural area.29 3 This requirenent would encourage farmers to support comprehensive planning in their community or, alter288. Currently the Agricultural Area Security Law provides the following incentives:
(I) Protection from eminent domain activities, syupra notes 159-62 and accompanying text;
(2) Favorable treatment from Commonwealth agencies, supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text; and
(3) Possible development easement purchases by county government, supra notes 163-72
and accompanying text.
The public nuisance protection provided by the law was rendered ineffective by subsequent passage of legislation granting nuisance protection to all agricultural land in the state.
See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
290. The Agricultural Area Security Law currently contains no penalty for farmer withdrawal. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. A public investments provision could
help to prevent withdrawal from agricultural areas without imposition of a statutory penalty.
291. Local government also could use public investments in a positive fashion to channel
development away from productive agricultural land. Establishment of designated development areas with guaranteed access to public facilitites may divert developer acquisition of
farmland. Development incentives should be used in the same manner as agricultural incentives. Increasing the viability of residential development in areas selected by local government
planners thus can reduce competition for productive farmland.
292. Property taxes impose a disproportionate burden of farmers. See supra notes 82-83
and accompanying text.
293. Virginia accords differential taxation benefits only to land either enrolled in agricultural districts or located in municipalities that adopt comprehensive development plans. VA.
CODE §§15.1-1506 to 15.1-1513 (Cumm. Supp. 1983).

natively, would provide a major incentive for participation in
agricultural areas. The Commonwealth should further stimulate local government planning by compensating municipalities that have
adopted comprehensive plans for the tax loss suffered by differential
assessment.2 94 Such a compensation program, in addition to encouraging planned development, would distribute more equitably the
statewide cost of differential taxation of farmland. 295 Farmers and
nonfarmers alike would encourage adoption of comprehensive plans
by local government units. Farmers would seek planning as a prerequisite to differential tax treatment while nonfarmers, feeling the
brunt of the property tax shift, would promote local government
planning to become eligible for state compensation.
Active Commonwealth encouragement of comprehensive planning may legitimize local government zoning measures adopted pursuant to a community plan. Similarly, the Commonwealth should
announce a strong policy in favor of farmland preservation and ordered development. A strong policy statement favoring these goals
may sway Pennsylvania courts to uphold a challenged zoning ordinance designed to preserve farmland or to effectuate planned
development.2 9 6
Purchase of development easements clearly is the most troublesome component of the Pennsylvania plan. Purchase of easements
provides the most effective guarantee of continued agricultural use
yet does so at a prohibitively expensive cost. 2 9 7 Further, easement
purchase compensates farmers for the same type of restriction that
has gone uncompensated under zoning regulations for decades.29 a
The funds spent to purchase easements could be directed more efficiently and equitably toward increasing the economic viability of all
farmers rather than merely purchasing easements from a few landowners.29 9 If purchase of development easements is to remain part
of Pennsylvania's program, the state should provide matching funds
to counties that undertake purchases. 3" For matching purposes the
state could use funds collected through operation of the rollback and
294. New York's agricultural districts law provides compensation to local governments for
taxes lost through differential assessment. N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW §§ 3&]-207 (MCKinMey Supp.1986). This practice may make municipalities more enthusiastic about differential taxation because the community does not bear the tax revenue loss.
295.

See supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.

296. See supra notes 283 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 163-72 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
299. Purchase of development easements involves high cost for relatively small amounts
of protected acreage. The Suffolk County, New York, easement purchase program spent $10
million to protect slightly more than 2000 acres. PROTECTION OF FARMLAND, supra note 2, at

163.
300. Maryland provides matching funds for the purchase of development easements to
participating counties on a 60% state, 40% county basis. MD. AGRIC. CODE ANN. §§ 2-501 to
2-515 (Supp. 1983).

penalty provisions of the differential assessment program.3° ' Pennsylvania should not maintain the measure as currently written because counties cannot afford to implement the easement purchase
provision. 302
Thus, the Pennsylvania Legislature can improve the farmland
preservation program by utilizing the following recommendations.
First, all special benefits for farmers should be contingent upon participation in an agricultural area. Second, public investment should
be used to protect agricultural areas and to channel development to
areas unsuited for agricultural production. Third, differential assessment should be used to encourage participation in agricultural areas
and development of comprehensive plans. Fourth, the Commonwealth should promote local government planning and zoning by
making property tax compensation to communities contingent upon
formulation of a plan and by articulating a strong policy in favor of
planning and zoning to preserve agricultural land. Last, if Pennsylvania remains committed conceptually to easement purchase,
matching funds should be provided to county governments that undertake a purchase program.
These revisions do not change the voluntary basis of preservation efforts by farmers and, consequently, will not result in ironclad
protection of the Commonwealth's agricultural land. 30 3 If Pennsylvania wishes to provide more formidable farmland protection, the
legislature should consider a program that offers incentives to farmers in return for the farmer's acceptance of stricter land use controls.
B. Incentive Based Land Use Controls

The Pennsylvania program, even in revised form, suffers from
several fundamental flaws. Each local government unit independently carries out zoning and planning functions. Thus, no regional
or state-wide coordination exists. Independent local government
planning was expedient when each community confronted a unique
set of problems; urban growth and agricultural land preservation,
however, are not individualized local problems. These development
considerations are regional or even state-wide in scope. Admittedly,
local government still must play a primary role in developmental
planning, but the Commonwealth should participate in coordinating
and evaluating local plans in terms of regional and state-wide goals.
In addition, Pennsylvania's program provides incentives indis301. Id.
302. See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
303. Incentive based programs enhance the viability of farming rather than restrict land
use to prevent conversion of farmland to nonagricultural use. These voluntary programs afford minimal protection to farmland located in urban-fringe areas. See supra notes 192 and
277 and accompanying text.

criminately without regard to the economic circumstances of individual farmers.3" 4 Gentlemen farmers and profitable agrobusinesses receive the same property tax break as farm families, near
poverty, trying to eke out a living. Finally, the Pennsylvania program does not provide any restrictions probibiting conversion of agricultural land to development use. Pennsylvania efforts rely
completely on voluntary preservation by farmers.3 0 5
An innovative farmland preservation program implemented in
Wisconsin 3 1 five years ago addresses the fundamental problems encountered in Pennsylvania's program. The Wisconsin program
makes state income tax credits available to farmers contingent upon
adoption of an agricultural preservation plan or zoning ordinance by
the locality in which the farm is situated. 30 7 The amount of this
credit to eligible30 8 farmers depends upon the relationship of the
farmer's property tax assessment to the farmer's household income. 30 9 Thus, a low income family with high property taxes receives a larger credit than a family with either a high income or a
low property tax assessment. This tax credit system directs the highwith
est benefits to families with the greatest need. Further, farmers
3 10
an income above a certain level receive no tax credit at all.
For a farmer to be eligible for tax credits, his farm must be located in a jurisdiction that has adopted strict agricultural preservation measures.31 ' When the local government unit adopts an
agricultural preservation plan or exclusive agricultural zoning
scheme, a landowner receives seventy percent of the maximum credit
for which he qualifies.3 t2 When a governing body adopts both an
agricultural preservation plan and an exclusive agricultural zoning
ordinance, the farmer receives one hundred percent of the allowable
credit.31 3 Thus, the greater the restriction imposed, the greater the
304. Although the goal of Pennsylvania's incentive program, in theory, is to lessen economic hardships on farmers, the program includes no mechanism to direct benefits to those
individuals most severely affected by the economic deterioration of commercial agriculture.
305. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
306. WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 91.01-91.79 (West Supp. 1983). PROTECTION OF FARMLAND,
supra note 2, at 214-24, describes the Wisconsin program and compares the provisions to efforts in other states.
307. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 91.13 (West Supp. 1983).
308. To be eligible for an income tax credit, the farmer must own at least 35 acres of
contiguous land devoted primarily to agricultural use. In addition, the land must have produced $6000 in agricultural gross profits the preceding year or $18,000 gross profits during the

prior three years. Id § 91.01.
309. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 71.09 (West Supp. 1983).
310. Id
311. In 1977, when Wisconsin initially enacted its program, farmers could qualify for tax
credits by entering into temporary restrictive covenants. This interim provision enabled local
governments to study various land use measures before implementation of a plan. The state
will not enter into temporary covenants after September 30, 1982. PROTECTION OF FARMLAND, supra note 2, at 215.

312.
313.

WIS. STAT. ANN. § 71.09 (West Supp. 1983).
Id

benefit received by farmers.
The Wisconsin Act also established a state level Agricultural
Lands Preservation Board that reviews local government plans and
zoning ordinances.31 4 The state pays no tax credit until the Board
approves the locality's plan or zoning ordinance. 3 5 The Board also
handles any appeals relating to the program.31 6
The reaction of Wisconsin farmers to the program has been
overwhelming. Prior to passage of the program, only four counties
had adopted agricultural zoning. 7 Within three years of passage,
forty-nine counties, representing eighty-one percent of the state's
farmland, implemented some phase of the program.3 ' 8 Furthermore, the cost of the program has not proven excessive in comparison to other states' measures. 31 9 In 1978, the tax credit program
initiated protection of an estimated 2,543,160 acres of farmland at a
cost of only $1.38 per acre. 320 Easement purchase programs com32 1
monly spend two thousand dollars to protect an acre of land.
The Wisconsin law is preferable to the Pennsylvania program
for the following reasons. First, the tax credit system provides
financial incentives based on economic need. Second, the program
encourages mandatory restrictions initiated by voluntary action on
the part of the farmer. Third, a tax credit based system evenly distributes the cost of farmland preservation to all residents of the state.
Fourth, the zoning and planning requirements of the Wisconsin program encourage ordered growth and provide centralized coordination of development. Last, the tax credit system provides greater
farmland protection at a lower cost than methods employed by other
states.
Wisconsin's incentive based land use control program also satisfies the requirements enumerated at the outset of this analysis. First,
314. Wisconsin's statute also establishes minimum requirements for preservation plans
and provides a list of standard that local government zoning ordinances must satisfy. Id.

§§ 91.51-91.79.
315.
316.
317.

Id
Id
PROTECTION OF FARMLAND, mupra note 2, at 218.

318. Id
319. The Wisconsin tax credit program is considerably less expensive than purchase of
development easements. See supra notes 163-72 and accompanying text.
320. As more farmers subject to exclusive zoning ordinances apply for income tax credits,
the price to protect an acre of land will rise slightly. Even if the program achieves total statewide enrollment, however, the price to preserve an acre of farmland should not exceed $7 to
$10. PROTECTION OF FARMLAND, supra note 2, at 219.

321. See supra note 168. Easement purchase involves a large one-time expense as opposed
to the annual tax credits distributed by Wisconsin's program. The Wisconsin system, however,
enjoys greater flexibility than easement purchase. The tax credit system responds to economic
changes within the agricultural industry. When farm income falls as a result of poor harvests,
the available tax credit increases. Conversely, when income rises, farmers receive proportionately less income tax relief from the state. Thus, the Wisconsin tax credit system induces restriction of land use and, simultaneously, increases the viability of agricultural operations.

farmers voluntarily initiate imposition of restrictions that result in a
sacrifice of ownership rights. Second, development needs are addressed concurrently with preservation goals. Last, the Wisconsin
tax credit program efficiently improves the economic viability of agricultural operations.
VI.

Conclusion

Increasingly, Pennsylvania farmers abandon farming and initiate irreversible conversion of productive agricultural land. While
causing negligible immediate hardship to citizens of Pennsylvania,
widespread conversion of agricultural land may reduce substantially
the Commonwealth's ability to satisfy future food production requirements. Responding to the farmland depletion problem, the
Pennsylvania Legislature enacted an array of nonintegrated measures that marginally increase economic viability of farming, but fail
appreciably to deter conversion of productive agricultural land.
An effective farmland preservation program must prohibit conversion of prime agricuftural lands while increasing viability of farm
operations and facilitating planned community development. A program founded on incentive-based land use controls effectuates these
multiple goals. In such a program, farmers voluntarily initiate imposition of land use restrictions. In return, the state provides income
tax credits to mitigate the harshness of controlled land use.
Pennsylvania's wholly voluntary preservation program does not
afford sufficient protection to farmland. The state legislature, in cooperation with local government, should institute an incentive-based
program that provides stringent protection to productive agricultural
lands.
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